UK General Elections (1990s)

These General Election and Referendum case studies have been prepared for AQA A-Level Students from AMSR NOP and MORI reports on the Elections, produced at the time, plus 2 detailed analyses of the AMSR Archive Content produced by AMSR Volunteers: “Polling in UK Elections Since 1945” (focussed on Voting Behaviour and the Media) & “Why Polls Go Wrong”.  Please read the Technical Appendix at the end of this document for an explanation of the AMSR Archive, why this resource does not cover all elections, and how we have reported the others. And links to the 2 in-depth documents, links to the actual Election Reports are included in the text.

1992 General Election — The Unexpected Conservative Victory

Wider Context

• Britain was emerging from recession, with fragile economic optimism and high unemployment.
• John Major, who succeeded Margaret Thatcher in 1990, campaigned as a calmer, more moderate Conservative leader.
• Neil Kinnock had modernised Labour significantly since 1983, but doubts remained about Labour’s tax and spending plans.
• The Liberal Democrats struggled to maintain momentum after the SDP–Liberal merger, losing support among public-sector workers.

Campaign Techniques

• This was one of the most heavily polled elections in British history.
• MORI, Gallup, NOP, Harris and ASL all conducted frequent national polls; MORI also ran large face-to-face surveys (e.g., 1,798 interviews, 21–26 May 1992).
• Exit polls were conducted for broadcasters, but their seat projections were misinterpreted by BBC/ITN analysts.
• The campaign was dominated by televised events, especially Labour’s high-profile “Sheffield Wednesday” rally, which MORI identified as a turning point.

Issue Salience

• MORI found unemployment and the NHS were consistently the top issues:
  • Unemployment: 57% (May 1992)
  • NHS/health care: 32%
  • Economy: 27%
• Education, Europe, and law and order were also significant concerns.
• Economic optimism improved sharply late in the campaign:
  • Net optimism rose from –2% (Feb) to +21% (Apr).

Polling & Media

MORI’s Election Review provides a clear explanation of why the polls failed:

“There was a decided swing to the Tories in the last week of the election, following Labour’s ‘Sheffield Wednesday’ rally.”

“About one voter in ten decided how to vote or changed his or her mind in the final 24 hours of the election.”

Key polling factors identified by MORI:

• Late swing: around 2% moved to the Conservatives in the final days.
• Differential turnout: Labour supporters were less likely to vote; registration bias also hurt Labour.
• Differential refusal: MORI estimated this at “half a point”, favouring the Conservatives.
• Postal votes: a small bias towards the Conservatives.
• Exit polls: showed a 4–5% Conservative lead, but broadcasters incorrectly translated this into a hung parliament.
• Structural shifts:

“Defection of public sector workers from the Liberal Democrats to the Tories accounted for much of the drop in the LibDem share.”

MORI strongly rejected the Market Research Society’s claim of long-term Labour over-representation:

“The conclusion that Labour has somehow systematically had some built-in advantage is nonsense.”

Voting Behaviour

• MORI’s long-term tracking showed a tightening race through early 1992, with the Conservatives pulling ahead in March and April.
• The final MORI pre-election poll (25–28 April) showed:
  • Conservatives: 43%
  • Labour: 38%
  • Liberal Democrats: 16%
• Satisfaction ratings:
  • Major: 55% satisfied / 35% dissatisfied (Apr)
  • Kinnock: 33% satisfied / 53% dissatisfied
  • Ashdown: consistently positive (around 50% satisfied)
• Issue-based voting:
  • Labour’s tax and spending plans worried swing voters.
  • Fear of a hung parliament pushed hesitant voters towards the Conservatives.
  • Many voters reluctant to vote Conservative were also unwilling to vote Lib Dem “for fear of letting Labour in”.

Outcome

• The Conservatives won a fourth consecutive term, with a clear lead in the popular vote.
• Labour improved its vote share compared with 1987 but fell short of expectations.
• The Liberal Democrats’ vote share dropped, partly due to public-sector defections to the Conservatives.
• The result shocked commentators and broadcasters, who had expected a hung parliament.

Key AMSR Insights

• Polling failure was behavioural, not statistical: late swing, turnout, refusals, and registration bias.
• Media misinterpretation played a major role in public expectations.
• Leadership mattered: confidence in Major and concerns about Kinnock were decisive.
• Economic optimism shifted late, benefiting the Conservatives.
• Fear of a hung parliament influenced tactical behaviour.
• Polls usually perform well: MORI emphasised that long-term accuracy remained strong despite 1992’s failure.

AMSR Link:  British Public Opinion Issue 15.04 1992 June – Page 1 – MORI British Public Opinion – The AMSR Online Archive

1997 General Election — Labour Landslide

Wider Context

• After 18 years of Conservative government, public fatigue was high.
• John Major’s administration had been weakened by internal divisions over Europe, economic fallout from Black Wednesday (1992), and repeated sleaze scandals.
• Tony Blair’s New Labour project repositioned Labour as centrist, modern, disciplined, and economically credible.
• The Liberal Democrats under Paddy Ashdown focused on constitutional reform, education, and targeted constituency campaigning.

Campaign Techniques

• Labour ran one of the most professionalised campaigns in modern British history:
  • Rapid rebuttal, message discipline, and strong media management.
  • Blair’s personal popularity was central to the campaign narrative.
• Conservatives struggled to maintain coherence, especially on Europe.
• Liberal Democrats used intensive local campaigning to convert votes into seats.

Issue Salience

From MORI’s April 1997 tracking:

• Health care: 68%
• Education: 61%
• Law & order: 51%
• Unemployment: 49%
• Pensions: 39%
• Taxation: 33%
• Managing the economy: 30%
• Europe: 22%

These align closely with Labour’s campaign priorities (NHS, education, crime, economic competence).

Polling & Media

The 1997 election was characterised by polling stability, not polling failure.

MORI conducted three final polls:

1. The Times face-to-face poll (2,304 interviews, 29 April)
2. Evening Standard panel recall poll (1,501 electors, 30 April)
3. ITV exit poll (14,888 voters in marginal constituencies, 1 May)

The newsletter states:

“Where were all those ‘Shy Tories’?”

And:

“MORI’s 1997 General Election voting aggregate is compiled from interviews… with 13,544 British adults.”

Final poll figures (major companies):

• Conservative: 31%
• Labour: 47%
• Liberal Democrat: 16%
• Others: 6%

Average error across pollsters: 1–2%.

Exit poll projection (ITV/MORI):

• Con: 30% (actual 31.4%)
• Lab: 46% (actual 44.4%)
• LD: 18% (actual 17.2%)
• Others: 6% (actual 7.0%)

The exit poll predicted a Labour landslide, and the seat projection was close to the final certified result.

Voter movement during the campaign

MORI’s recall survey found:

“The equivalent of 12.4 million people actually changed their minds during the six weeks of the election.”

This is one of the most important behavioural findings of 1997.

Voting Behaviour

Demographic patterns (from MORI’s 13,544-interview aggregate):

• Gender
  • Men: Con 31%, Lab 45%
  • Women: Con 32%, Lab 44%
• Age
  • 18–24: Lab 49%, Con 27%
  • 25–34: Lab 49%, Con 28%
  • 35–44: Lab 41%, Con 31%
  • 55+: Lab 41%, Con 36%
• Class
  • AB: Con 41%, Lab 31%
  • C1: Con 37%, Lab 37%
  • C2: Con 27%, Lab 50%
  • DE: Con 21%, Lab 59%
• Housing tenure
  • Owner-occupiers: Con 41%, Lab 32%
  • Council/HA tenants: Con 15%, Lab 49%
• Ethnicity
  • White: Con 32%, Lab 43%
  • Non-white: Con 18%, Lab 70%
• Union membership
  • Members: Lab 57%, Con 18%
  • Non-members: Lab 42%, Con 32%

Newspaper readership

• Daily Telegraph: Con 57%, Lab 20%
• The Sun: Con 30%, Lab 52%
• Daily Mirror: Con 14%, Lab 72%

These patterns illustrate Labour’s broad coalition and Conservative decline across key groups.

Leadership & Party Image

Leadership perceptions

From MORI’s perceptual maps:

• Blair: “A capable leader”, “sound judgement”, “understands problems”, “has a lot of personality”.
• Major: “Good in a crisis”, “patriotic”, but also “out of touch”, “talks down to people”.
• Ashdown: “Down-to-earth”, “understands problems”, “more honest than most politicians”.

Readiness for government

• “Labour is ready to form the next government”: 55% agree
• “Tony Blair is ready to be Prime Minister”: 53% agree

Party image

Labour was seen as:

• “Professional in its approach”
• “Has sensible policies”
• “Concerned about people in real need”
• “Represents all classes”

Conservatives were seen as:

• “Divided”
• “Out of touch with ordinary people”
• “Too dominated by its leader”

Outcome

• Labour won a landslide victory (official certified result).
• Conservatives suffered their worst defeat since 1906.
• Liberal Democrats increased their seats through targeted campaigning.
• The result marked the beginning of a decade of Labour dominance.

Key AMSR Insights

• Polling stability: Unlike 1992, polls were accurate and consistent.
• Leadership mattered: Blair’s ratings were exceptionally strong; Major’s were weak.
• Issue alignment: Labour’s focus on NHS, education, and crime matched voter priorities.
• Voter movement: MORI’s recall data showed 4 million voters changed their minds during the campaign.
• Party image transformation: New Labour successfully repositioned the party as modern and competent.
• Conservative fragmentation: Divisions over Europe and leadership undermined voter confidence.
• Media influence: Labour’s professional media strategy helped maintain message discipline and public trust.

AMSR LINK: British Public Opinion Issue 20.03/4 1997 April/June – Page 1 – MORI British Public Opinion – The AMSR Online Archive

 

 

Technical Appendix

About the Archive (AMSR)

The Archive of Market and Social Research (AMSR) preserves the original reports, surveys, and polling data produced by Britain’s major research organisations from the 1940s onwards, offering an unparalleled record of how public opinion was measured, reported, and understood at the time. Because the Archive contains the contemporary documents — Gallup, NOP, MORI, and others — it shows elections, referendums, and polling debates exactly as they were experienced, without hindsight or reinterpretation. This makes AMSR uniquely valuable for A-Level Politics: students can see how campaigns unfolded, how issues rose and fell in importance, how voters behaved, and how polls influenced expectations. The Archive also reveals why polls sometimes go wrong, how methods evolved, and how media reporting shaped political understanding. In short, AMSR provides the evidence base that allows students to evaluate elections, referendums, voting behaviour, and the reliability of political information using authentic historical sources.

Why AMSR  does not cover all Elections

This AMSR teaching resource draws on two archive documents: Polling in UK Elections Since 1945 (which isfocussed on Voting Behaviour and the Media) and Why Polls Go Wrong. These sources provide detailed historical context, polling evidence, and campaign analysis for UK General Elections from 1945 to 2015. Since these documents were produced the Archive does have a complete summary of the 2024 Election prepared by Ipsos especially for the Archive.  To maintain academic accuracy and ensure all content is grounded in verifiable AMSR evidence, this resource therefore covers uses AMSR sources for elections where we have them and uses publiclyavailable Ipsos, BES, BBC/ITV exit-poll findings, and ONS turnout statistics in other cases This is always clearly stated in the introduction to the particular Election/Referendum. AMSR Links are given in the text where we have them