Prepared by AMSR using the Archive
AMSR polling across five decades reveals a complex and deeply rooted set of public attitudes that shaped the development of devolution in England, Scotland and Wales. These attitudes were not uniform across the UK; they reflected longstanding differences in national identity, regional distinctiveness, political culture and trust in institutions. Together, they produced the UK’s asymmetrical constitutional settlement — a structure that continues to define UK governance today.
1. England: Regional variation, weak identity, limited mobilisation
Across the archive, England stands out for its lack of a national devolution movement. AMSR evidence shows:
- Weak regional identity in many areas (e.g., only 52% in the Eastern region could identify their government region).
- Mixed support for regional assemblies (45% support; 38% oppose).
- Sharp regional variation in attitudes (London +39 vs South East –10).
- Low trust in regional politicians (only 34% believed they would be more trustworthy than Westminster MPs).
- Preference for local interests to be better protected by regional bodies (65% agreed), but scepticism about creating new institutions.
These attitudes explain why England did not develop a national Parliament and why constitutional debates focused on regionalism, not national identity. The introduction of English Votes for English Laws (EVEL) was a procedural workaround rather than a public-driven constitutional reform.
2. Scotland: Strong identity, clear preferences, sustained mobilisation
AMSR evidence shows that Scotland had a politically salient national identity and clear constitutional preferences long before devolution became a reality:
- As early as 1976, 52% supported a Scottish Assembly with substantial powers.
- Constitutional questions were consistently present in Scottish political culture, even when economic issues dominated.
- The 1978–79 referendum period saw rising dissatisfaction with Westminster and growing constitutional consciousness.
- Long-term polling (2008–2012) shows stable support for devomax, with independence support fluctuating but identity mobilisation remaining strong.
Scottish political culture is consistently identity-driven, constitutional, and mobilised, explaining why Scotland developed a Parliament with expanding powers and why constitutional questions remain central to Scottish politics.
3. Wales: Dual identity, gradualist change, community-based politics
Wales followed a more incremental path, shaped by dual identity and community-centred political culture.
Evidence from three AMSR sources shows:
- NOP 1989:
- 49% supported an elected Welsh Assembly; 34% opposed.
- Support rose to 58% if Scotland gained an Assembly first (“me too” effect).
- Strong regional variation (e.g., 56% support in North Wales).
- Language strongly predicted constitutional attitudes (61% of Welsh speakers supported an Assembly).
- Devolution salience was low (only 1% named it as their top issue in Pontypridd).
- MORI/JRRT 1995:
- Majority support for a Welsh Assembly, but with lower intensity than Scotland.
- Support for constitutional reform and greater local control over public services.
- Evidence of gradualist preferences and moderate trust in devolved institutions.
- MORI/Economist 1999:
- 36% supported giving greater powers to English regions; 39% opposed.
- Wales viewed English regional devolution as less threatening than Scotland did, reflecting a more moderate constitutional culture.
Taken together, these sources show that Welsh political culture is shaped by community identity, language, and local governance, rather than national constitutional mobilisation. Support for devolution grew gradually, reflecting Wales’s dual identity (Welsh and British) and a preference for incremental increases in powers. Wales developed an Assembly (later a Parliament) through steady, moderate support, not through the high-salience mobilisation seen in Scotland.
4. Identity and Political Culture: The Core Drivers of Divergence
Across the archive, identity and political culture emerge as the key drivers of constitutional divergence:
- Scotland: strong identity → strong constitutional preferences → sustained mobilisation → Parliament with primary powers.
- Wales: dual identity → gradualist preferences → incremental devolution → expanding powers over time.
- England: weaker regional identity → mixed support → institutional scepticism → no national devolution.
These differences explain why the UK developed an asymmetrical constitutional structure.
5. Referendums: Salience, arguments and constitutional outcomes
AMSR referendum research (Curtice) shows:
- High-salience referendums (e.g., 2014 independence) produce argument-linked voting, strong mobilisation and clear outcomes.
- Low-salience referendums (e.g., 2011 AV) show weaker links between arguments and voting behaviour.
- The 1997 Scottish and Welsh devolution referendums succeeded because identity was salient, arguments were clear, and stakes were widely understood.
- England lacked these conditions, helping explain the absence of a national devolution movement.
6. The UK’s asymmetrical constitutional settlement
Taken together, AMSR evidence shows that:
- Devolution was not imposed from above; it emerged from public attitudes, identity differences, and regional political cultures.
- Scotland and Wales developed national legislatures because public opinion supported clear constitutional change.
- England remained governed primarily through Westminster because public opinion did not mobilise around national devolution.
The result is a multilevel, asymmetrical constitutional system that continues to shape UK governance, intergovernmental relations and debates about reform.
Prepared by Phyllis Macfarlane with help from CoPilot
2026