How to compare elections – an example using AMSR resources

1997 compared with 1974 and 2024 elections

Overview 

This document brings together AMSR evidence to compare three major “change-of-the-guard” General Elections — 1974, 1997 and 2024 — alongside detailed case studies of each. It summarises the wider political context, issue salience, leadership effects, campaign dynamics, tactical voting, polling behaviour and electoral outcomes, showing how these elections reflect both continuity and change in British politics. By placing these contests side by side, the resource helps students understand long-term trends in voting behaviour, the evolving role of the media and opinion polls, and the conditions that produce major shifts in party fortunes. 

Contents

1. Summary of the 2024 General Election
2. Summary of the 1974 General Elections (February and October)
3. Summary of the 1997 General Election 
4. Comparison: 1974 and 2024 General Elections
5. Comparison: 1974 and 1997 General Elections
6. Comparison: 1997 and 2024 General Elections
7. Three Elections Across 50 Years: 1974 to 1997 to 2024
8. How to Compare Elections – a guide

1. Summary of the 2024 General Election 

One of the Archive’s major supporters, IPSOS, has compiled a review of the 2024 General Election, including some useful comparisons to 1997, and over time.The report is highly relevant for the A-Level Politics curriculum, which includes the study of three UK elections including 1997.

Click here to view and/or download IPSOS’ ‘How the voters voted in the 2024 election’. The estimates are based on people’s answers to a post-election survey immediately after polling day and explore differences in voting patterns by gender, age, social class and more

Source: Ipsos General Election 2024 Campaign Briefing (AMSR)  

1.1. Wider political context

The 2024 General Election took place against a backdrop of deep public dissatisfaction with government performance, economic strain, and declining trust in political leadership. Ipsos tracking shows:

• • • 62% believed Britain was heading in the wrong direction (June 2024).
    • Record dissatisfaction with the government: Sunak’s net satisfaction –71, the lowest for any PM entering an election since records began.
    • Public services were seen to have deteriorated: 78% said services had got worse over the past five years.
    • The Conservatives were blamed for the poor state of the economy: 54% cited Conservative economic policies as a major cause.

Economic optimism had begun to improve slightly before the election, but most voters still felt the cost-of-living crisis had not peaked.

1.2. Issue Salience

Ipsos tracking across the campaign shows remarkable stability in the issues voters considered most important:

• • • 1. NHS / Healthcare — 65%
    • 2. Inflation / Cost of living — 52%
    • 3. Immigration — 43%
    • 4. Managing the economy — 42%
    • 5. Crime / anti-social behaviour — 35%
    • 6. Public services generally — 34%
    • 7. Taxation — 33%
    • 8. Poverty / inequality — 31%
    • 9. Housing — 31%
    • 10. Care for older and disabled people — 31%

These issues remained stable across all six weeks of the campaign.

1.3. Campaign Dynamics

The Ipsos tracker shows:

• • • 78% thought it was time for change.
    • 54% said the Conservatives had a bad campaign.
    • Support for Reform UK grew steadily throughout the campaign.
    • Tactical voting was significant: 17% said they would vote tactically.
    • Labour experienced a late-campaign dip, but retained a strong lead.

Only two in five 2019 Conservative voters still supported the party by polling day. Among 2019 Conservatives (3 July 2024):

• • • 39% Conservative
    • 25% Reform
    • 8% Labour
    • 5% Liberal Democrat
    • 3% Green
    • 8% undecided

This collapse in Conservative loyalty was decisive.

1.4. Leadership effects

Leadership ratings were historically poor:

Rishi Sunak

• • • Net satisfaction –53 entering the campaign
    • Lowest PM rating entering an election since Callaghan
    • Rated poorly on capability, judgement, crisis management, and understanding Britain’s problems

Keir Starmer

• • • Net satisfaction –21 entering the campaign
    • The most unpopular opposition leader ever to become Prime Minister
    • But Labour was seen as fit to govern: only 34% said Labour was “not ready for government”, compared with 59% for Corbyn in 2019.

Leadership perceptions did not change significantly during the campaign.

1.5. Party Brands

Ipsos tracking shows:

Conservatives

• • • Deep brand damage
    • Only 15% said they were “fit to govern”
    • Only 12% said they had a “good team of leaders”
    • High negative ratings on delivery, competence, and trust

Labour

• • • No longer seen as “scary” or “unfit for government”
    • Strong leads on almost every policy area:
      • Healthcare +32
      • Poverty/inequality +31
      • Cost of living +21
      • Education +19
      • Housing +26
      • Economy +10

Labour entered the election more trusted on the economy than the Conservatives — a reversal of the long-standing pattern since 2010.

1.6. How Britain voted

Ipsos post-election data (15,234 adults, weighted to actual results):

Age

• • • Labour led in every age group except 65+
    • Conservatives strongest among 65+ (43%)
    • Greens surged among 18–24s (+16 points vs 2019)
    • Reform UK strongest among 45–64s (18%)

Gender

• • • Conservative support fell sharply among men (–23 points)
    • Reform UK stronger among men (17%) than women (13%)
    • Labour slightly stronger among younger women than younger men

Vote switching

• • • Conservatives retained only 53% of their 2019 voters
    • Reform UK gained 24% of 2019 Conservatives
    • Labour retained 71% of its 2019 vote
    • Labour lost 9% to Lib Dems and 9% to Greens
    • Lib Dems gained from both main parties

1.7 Exit poll

Ipsos managed sampling and data collection for the 2024 exit poll:

The exit poll was again highly accurate in predicting the overall outcome.

1.8 Outcome

Labour won a large majority (official results confirmed by the Electoral Commission). The Conservatives suffered a historic collapse. Reform UK reshaped the electoral map in key areas. The Liberal Democrats achieved major gains.

The Ipsos evidence shows that the 2024 election was driven by:

• • • dissatisfaction with government
    • issue salience (NHS, cost of living, immigration)
    • leadership weakness
    • tactical voting
    • vote switching
    • brand collapse
    • Reform UK’s rise

2. Summary of the 1974 General Elections (February and October) 

Sources: NOP Political Bulletins (Feb, Mar/Apr, Oct/Nov 1974); NOP Special Reports 1973; Worcester, “Pollsters, the Press and Political Polling in Britain” (AMSR)

AMSR LINKS:

NOP Political Bulletin 1974 February – Page 1 – NOP Reports – The AMSR Online Archive

NOP Political Bulletin 1974 March/April – Page 1 – NOP Reports – The AMSR Online Archive

NOP Political Bulletin 1974 October – Page 2 – NOP Reports – The AMSR Online Archive

NOP Political Bulletin 1974 November – Page 5 – NOP Reports – The AMSR Online Archive

NOP Political Bulletin: a Special Report on Public Opinion, September 1973 – December 1973, for the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys – Page 2 – NOP Reports – The AMSR Online Archive

Pollsters, the Press, and Political Polling in Britain – Page 1 – Papers and Offprints – The AMSR Online Archive

The Polls: Britain at the polls, 1945-1983 – Page 1 – Opinion Poll Reports – The AMSR Online Archive

2.1. Wider political context

The two 1974 elections took place during one of the most turbulent periods in post-war British politics. The AMSR NOP reports show that voters were preoccupied with:

• • • Inflation (at historic highs)
    • Energy crisis (Three-Day Week)
    • Strikes and industrial conflict (“Who governs Britain?”)
    • Common Market / EU membership
    • Immigration
    • Middle East conflict & Irish Troubles

Both major party leaders — Edward Heath and Harold Wilson — were unpopular, and public confidence in government was low.

2.2. Leadership effects

NOP evidence shows:

• • • Wilson was not popular before the February election, but his ratings rose sharply afterwards.
    • Heath’s leadership was damaged by industrial conflict and perceptions of indecision.
    • Jeremy Thorpe (Liberal) experienced a dramatic rise in popularity between 1973 and 1974.

NOP February 1974 shows Thorpe rated the most impressive party leader — a striking contrast with the two main party leaders.

2.3. Campaign techniques

The 1974 elections were heavily influenced by polling and media coverage:

• • • Six polling organisations were active.
    • Public exposure to polls was rising:
      • 56% saw polls in 1970
      • 58% in Feb 1974
      • 60% in Oct 1974
      • 67% by 1979
    • Worcester notes that arguments about polls were already widespread: “Arguments about polls are not new.”

The BBC’s exit poll in October 1974 famously mis-forecast a 150-seat majority (actual majority: 3), though later analysis showed the underlying data was sound.

2.4. Issue salience

NOP reports show the key issues were:

• • • inflation
    • industrial relations
    • energy crisis
    • cost of living
    • immigration
    • Europe (Common Market)

These issues closely mirror those of the 2024 election.

2.5. Polling & media Influence

NOP analysis of the February election shows:

• • • Polls overestimated Liberal support
    • Polls underestimated Labour support
    • Late swings were decisive
    • Many voters misunderstood what polls were showing.

NOP March/April 1974 confirms: “Late switching from Liberal to Labour.”

This late movement was the main reason the February election was mis-forecast.

2.6. Tactical voting

NOP October 1974 provides one of the clearest early measures of tactical voting in British elections.

Q. If your own party could not win locally, would you consider voting Liberal

NOP summary:

“Half the electorate would vote for their own party in preference to a ‘tactical vote’ for the Liberals even if they thought their own party did not stand a chance.”

This helps explain the February polling errors: many Liberal voters switched late to Labour in marginals.

2.7. The Liberals & the coalition question

NOP evidence shows:

• • • The Liberals were performing exceptionally well.
    • Thorpe’s popularity surged between 1973 and 1974.
    • A Heath–Thorpe coalition was a real possibility after the February election.
    • Wilson’s “rude rebuff” to Thorpe’s coalition initiative may have influenced mid-July polling shifts.

The Economist (quoted in NOP July 1974) noted: “Those who answer pollsters’ questions are notoriously coalition-minded.” This remains one of the most intriguing “what-ifs” in modern British politics.

2.8. February 1974 — Hung Parliament

Outcome

• • • Conservatives won more votes
    • Labour won more seats
    • Result: hung parliament

Why the polls were wrong

NOP evidence identifies:

• • • late Liberal → Labour switching
    • high volatility
    • high proportion of late deciders
    • misunderstanding of polls
    • methodological inconsistencies

This election is a classic example of polling failure.

2.9. October 1974 — Narrow Labour majority

Outcome

• • • Labour won a majority of 3
    • Polls predicted a Labour win but overestimated the lead

Campaign dynamics

• • • Wilson sought stability
    • Liberals remained strong
    • Tactical voting continued
    • Poll exposure increased
    • Exit poll mis-forecast the scale of the majority

NOP November 1974 report shows continued volatility and tactical behaviour.

2.10. Why  Feb 1974 matters

The AMSR evidence shows that Feb 1974 is one of the most instructive elections for understanding:

• • • volatility
    • late swings
    • tactical voting
    • polling accuracy
    • leadership effects
    • issue salience
    • coalition possibilities
    • media influence

It is also one of the most useful elections for comparing with 2024, because the issues of  environment and leadership dynamics are remarkably similar.

3. Summary of the 1997 General Election

AMSR LINK:

British Public Opinion Issue 20.03/4 1997 April/June – Page 1 – MORI British Public Opinion – The AMSR Online Archive

3.1 Wider Political Context

The 1997 General Election followed 18 years of Conservative government, during a period of public fatigue, economic recovery after Black Wednesday, and widespread concern about political integrity. MORI evidence shows that the Conservatives were seen as divided, especially over Europe, and that “sleaze” scandals had damaged trust in government. Labour under Tony Blair had been transformed into New Labour — centrist, modern, disciplined, and electorally broad. Public mood was strongly in favour of change, and MORI tracking found a clear and stable “time for change” sentiment throughout the campaign.

3.2 Issue Salience

MORI’s April 1997 tracking shows the issues voters considered most important: Health care (68%), education (61%), law and order (51%), unemployment (49%), pensions (39%), taxation (33%), managing the economy (30%), and Europe (22%). These aligned closely with Labour’s campaign priorities. The Conservatives struggled to regain trust on economic management and public services.

3.3 Campaign Dynamics

The 1997 campaign was one of the most professionalised in modern British history. Labour ran a disciplined message grid (“New Labour, New Britain”), used rapid rebuttal, and managed media coverage effectively. Blair’s personal popularity was central to the narrative. The Conservatives struggled with internal division and leadership doubts surrounding John Major. Liberal Democrats used targeted constituency campaigning and benefited from tactical voting. MORI’s recall survey found that “the equivalent of 12.4 million people actually changed their minds during the six weeks of the election.”

3.4 Leadership Effects

Leadership was decisive. Tony Blair had exceptionally strong ratings for competence, trust, modernisation and communication, and was widely seen as ready to be Prime Minister. John Major was rated as “good in a crisis” and “patriotic”, but also “out of touch” and “talks down to people”. Paddy Ashdown was well-liked and seen as honest and down-to-earth.

3.5 Polling and Media Influence

1997 was characterised by polling stability. Final poll figures were close to the actual result, with average error around 1–2%. The exit poll predicted a Labour landslide and was close to the final certified result. This contrasts sharply with 1974 (polling errors) and 2024 (pre-election volatility).

3.6 Voting Behaviour

MORI’s aggregate (13,544 interviews) shows clear demographic patterns: Labour led among all age groups except the oldest; dominated among C2 and DE voters; was strong among council/HA tenants; and extremely strong among non-white voters. Union members were strongly Labour. These patterns illustrate Labour’s broad coalition and Conservative decline across key groups.

3.7 Tactical Voting

Tactical voting was widespread and decisive. Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters coordinated implicitly in many seats, contributing significantly to Labour’s seat gains. Liberal Democrats converted votes into seats through targeted campaigning.

3.8 Outcome

Labour won a landslide victory (official certified result), with a majority of 179 — one of the largest in modern British history. The Conservatives suffered their worst defeat since 1906. Liberal Democrats increased their seats through targeted campaigning. The result marked the beginning of a decade of Labour dominance and a major realignment in British politics.

3.9 Key AMSR Insights

Polling stability; Blair’s exceptionally strong leadership ratings; Labour’s alignment with voter priorities; high voter movement; successful party image transformation; Conservative fragmentation; and effective media strategy.

4. COMPARISON: 1974 and 2024 General Elections

Sources: NOP Political Bulletins 1973–74; Ipsos General Election 2024 Campaign Briefing (AMSR)

4.1. Overview

Although separated by fifty years, the 1974 and 2024 General Elections share striking similarities in issue salience, leadership weakness, volatility, tactical voting, and public dissatisfaction. 

4.2. Similarities between 1974 and 2024

4.2.1 Unpopular leaders

1974:

• • • • • Heath unpopular due to industrial conflict and economic strain.
        • Wilson not popular before February 1974, though his ratings improved afterwards.

2024:

• • • • • Sunak entered the campaign with the lowest PM satisfaction rating ever recorded (–71).
        • Starmer became PM despite being the most unpopular incoming opposition leader since records began (–21).

Similarity: Both elections were fought by leaders with historically weak public ratings.

4.2.2 Inflation and cost of living

1974: Inflation was the dominant issue; NOP reports show voters deeply concerned about rising prices and economic instability.

2024: Ipsos shows 52% citing inflation/cost of living as a top issue; economic pessimism remained high despite falling inflation.

Similarity: Inflation was central to both elections.

4.2.3 Energy crisis

1974: Three-Day Week, miners’ strike, industrial conflict.

2024: Energy bills, Ukraine war, long-term concerns about energy security.

Similarity: Energy supply and affordability were major political concerns.

4.2.4 Immigration

1974: NOP reports show immigration as a salient issue.

2024: Ipsos shows immigration consistently in the top three issues (43%).

Similarity: Immigration was a major electoral concern in both years.

4.2.5 International instability

1974: Middle East conflict, Irish Troubles.

2024: Middle East conflict, Ukraine war.

Similarity: Foreign crises shaped domestic political debate.

4.2.6 Tactical voting

1974: NOP October 1974 shows high tactical voting awareness:

• • • • • 44% would consider voting Liberal if their party couldn’t win.
        • Late Liberal → Labour switching caused February polling errors.

2024: Ipsos shows 17% saying they would vote tactically; tactical behaviour was decisive in many seats.

Similarity: Tactical voting played a major role in both elections.

4.2.7 Strong third party surge

1974: Liberals under Jeremy Thorpe surged dramatically; Thorpe rated the most impressive leader in February 1974.

2024: Reform UK surged, especially among 45–64 year-olds; gained 24% of 2019 Conservatives.

Similarity: A rising third party reshaped the electoral map.

4.2.8 Polling controversies

1974:

• • • • • Polls mis-forecast February result.
        • BBC exit poll in October predicted a 150 majority (actual majority: 3).
        • NOP documented late swings and methodological issues.

2024:

• • • • • Pre-election volatility.
        • Exit poll highly accurate (Labour 410 vs actual 412).

Similarity: Polling was central to campaign narratives in both elections.

4.3. Differences between 1974 and 2024

4.3.1 Unions and industrial relations

1974: Industrial conflict was the defining issue (“Who governs Britain?”).

2024: Unions were not central to the campaign.

4.3.2 Unemployment

1974: Major issue; NOP reports show high salience.

2024: Not a dominant concern.

4.3.3 Coalition possibility

1974: A Heath–Thorpe coalition was a real possibility after February 1974.

2024: No equivalent coalition scenario.

4.3.4 Liberal party strength

1974: Liberals at historic high; Thorpe extremely popular.

2024: Liberal Democrats strong but not decisive; Reform UK played the disruptive role.

4.3.5 Leadership recovery

1974: Wilson’s popularity rose sharply after February.

2024: Starmer’s ratings did not significantly improve during the campaign.

4.4. What these elections reveal about British politics

4.4.1 Volatility is not new

NOP evidence from 1974 shows dramatic late swings and high volatility — patterns mirrored in 2024.

4.4.2 Tactical voting has deep roots

The 1974 Liberal surge and late switching closely resemble 2024 tactical behaviour.

4.4.3 Issue salience is cyclical

Inflation, energy, immigration, and international instability recur across decades.

4.4.4 Leadership weakness can still produce change

Both Wilson (1974) and Starmer (2024) won despite weak personal ratings.

4.4.5 Third parties can reshape elections

Liberals in 1974 and Reform UK in 2024 both disrupted traditional voting patterns.

4.5. Summary table: 1974 vs 2024

4.6. Why this comparison is valuable for students

This comparison helps students:

• • • understand continuity and change in British elections
    • analyse issue salience across decades
    • evaluate leadership effects
    • explain tactical voting
    • assess polling accuracy
    • compare campaign dynamics
    • apply AMSR evidence to contemporary politics

It is one of the strongest cross-period comparisons available in the AMSR archive.

5. COMPARISON: 1974 and 1997 General Elections

Sources: NOP Political Bulletins 1973–74; MORI case study material for 1997 (AMSR)

5.1. Overview

The 1974 and 1997 General Elections are two of the most interesting contests in the AMSR archive. Both followed long periods of Conservative government, both were shaped by public dissatisfaction, and both involved tactical voting and major shifts in party fortunes. Yet they differ sharply in leadership strength, issue salience, and campaign discipline.

5.2. Similarities between 1974 and 1997

5.2.1 Public desire for change

1974:

• • • • • Industrial conflict, inflation, energy crisis, and political instability created a strong desire for change.
        • Heath’s “Who governs Britain?” campaign failed to reassure voters.

1997:

• • • • • After 18 years of Conservative rule, MORI evidence shows widespread fatigue and a clear “time for change” mood.
        • Major’s government seen as divided and exhausted.

Similarity: Both elections were driven by a broad public appetite for political change.

5.2.2 Conservative brand damage

1974:

• • • • • Heath’s government associated with strikes, inflation, and economic mismanagement.
        • NOP reports show low confidence in Conservative leadership.

1997:

• • • • • MORI evidence shows deep Conservative brand damage: sleaze, division, economic memories of Black Wednesday.
        • Conservatives seen as out of touch and lacking direction.

Similarity: In both elections, Conservative brand weakness was central to the outcome.

5.2.3 Tactical voting

1974: NOP October 1974 shows:

• • • • • 44% would consider voting Liberal tactically.
        • Late Liberal → Labour switching caused February polling errors.

1997: MORI evidence shows:

• • • • • Widespread tactical voting against Conservatives.
        • Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters coordinated implicitly in many seats.

Similarity: Tactical voting played a major role in both elections.

5.2.4 Strong third party influence

1974:

• • • • • Liberals under Jeremy Thorpe surged dramatically.
        • Thorpe rated the most impressive leader in February 1974.

1997:

• • • • • Liberal Democrats under Paddy Ashdown performed strongly.
        • Lib Dem tactical support helped Labour secure its landslide.

Similarity: A strong third party reshaped the electoral map in both elections.

5.2.5 Polling and media influence

1974:

• • • • • Polling errors in February; BBC exit poll mis-forecast October result.
        • Rising public exposure to polls (58% Feb; 60% Oct).

1997:

• • • • • Polls stable and accurate
        • Media coverage emphasised Labour’s modernisation and Conservative decline.

Similarity: Polling and media narratives were central to both campaigns.

5.3. Differences between 1974 and 1997

5.3.1 Leadership strength

1974:

• • • • • Heath unpopular; Wilson not popular before February.
        • Thorpe unusually popular for a third-party leader.

1997:

• • • • • Blair exceptionally popular, with high ratings for competence, trust, and modernisation.
        • Major seen as weak and divided.

Difference: 1974 featured weak leadership across the board; 1997 featured a dominant Labour leader.

5.3.2 Issue salience

1974:

• • • • • Inflation, energy crisis, strikes, industrial relations, immigration, Europe.

1997:

• • • • • NHS, education, crime, public services, economic competence, trust.

Difference: 1974 featured weak leadership across the board; 1997 featured a dominant Labour leader.

5.3.3 Campaign discipline

1974:

• • • • • Volatile campaign; late swings; inconsistent polling.
        • Coalition speculation after February.

1997:

• • • • • Highly disciplined Labour campaign (“New Labour, New Britain”).
        • Clear messaging, strong media management, stable polling.

Difference: 1974 was chaotic; 1997 was controlled and professionalised.

5.3.4 Outcomes

1974:

• • • • • February: hung parliament
        • October: Labour majority of 3

1997:

• • • • • Labour landslide majority of 179

5.4. What these elections reveal about British politics

5.4.1 Tactical voting Is a long-term feature

Both elections show voters willing to switch strategically when their preferred party cannot win.

5.4.2 Conservative decline can produce dramatic shifts

Conservative brand damage was central to both elections, though the scale differed.

5.4.3 Leadership matters

Weak leadership (1974) produces volatility; strong leadership (1997) produces stability and landslides.

5.4.4 Issue salience shapes campaign tone

Economic crisis (1974) vs public service reform (1997) created very different campaign environments.

5.5. Summary table: 1974 vs 1997

6. COMPARISON: 1997 and 2024 General Elections

6.1. Overview

The 1997 and 2024 General Elections are two of the clearest examples of decisive change in modern British politics. Both produced large Labour majorities, both followed long periods of Conservative government, and both were shaped by dissatisfaction, tactical voting, and party brand collapse. Yet they differ sharply in leadership strength, issue salience, and the nature of the third-party challenge.

6.2. Similarities between 1997 and 2024

6.2.1 Public desire for change

1997:

• • • • • After 18 years of Conservative rule, MORI evidence shows a strong “time for change” mood.
        • Major’s government seen as divided, tired, and lacking direction.

2024:

• • • • • Ipsos shows 78% believed it was time for change.
        • Conservative government associated with economic strain, public service decline, and leadership instability.

Similarity: Both elections were driven by a clear public appetite for political change.

6.2.2 Conservative brand collapse

1997:

• • • • • MORI evidence shows deep brand damage: sleaze, division, economic memories of Black Wednesday.
        • Conservatives seen as out of touch and lacking competence.

2024:

• • • • • Ipsos shows even deeper brand collapse:
          o 80% said the government had done a bad job on the NHS.
          o 77% said a bad job on cost of living.
          o 68% said a bad job on the economy.
        • Only 15% said the Conservatives were “fit to govern”.

Similarity: Conservative brand weakness was central to both elections.

6.2.3 Labour seen as “Fit to govern”

1997:

• • • • • Blair’s Labour seen as modern, competent, safe, and ready for government.
        • Strong leads on NHS, education, crime, and public services.

2024:

• • • • • Starmer’s Labour seen as fit to govern despite low personal ratings.
        • Strong leads on almost every policy area:
          o Healthcare +32
          o Poverty/inequality +31
          o Cost of living +21
          o Economy +10

Similarity: Labour was seen as the credible governing party in both elections.

6.2.4 Tactical voting

1997:

• • • • • MORI evidence shows widespread tactical voting against Conservatives.
        • Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters coordinated implicitly in many seats.

2024:

• • • • • Ipsos shows 17% said they would vote tactically.
        • Tactical voting was decisive in many constituencies, especially where Reform UK split the Conservative vote.

Similarity: Tactical voting played a major role in both elections.

6.2.5 Large Labour majorities

1997:

• • • • • Labour won a majority of 179 — one of the largest in modern history.

2024:

• • • • • Labour won a large majority (official results confirmed by the Electoral Commission).

Similarity: Both elections produced decisive Labour victories.

6.2.6 Issue salience around public services

1997:

• • • • • NHS and education were the top issues.
        • Labour’s focus on public service reform resonated strongly.

2024:

• • • • • NHS was the top issue (65%).
        • Public services seen to have deteriorated (78% said services had got worse).

Similarity: Public services were central to both elections.

6.3. Differences between 1997 and 2024

6.3.1 Leadership strength

1997:

• • • • • Blair exceptionally popular, with high ratings for competence, trust, and modernisation.
        • Major seen as weak and divided.

2024:

• • • • • Starmer’s personal ratings were historically low (net –21).
        • Sunak’s ratings were even lower (net –71).
        • Labour’s victory was driven more by party brand than leadership charisma.

Difference: 1997 featured a dominant Labour leader; 2024 featured a weak but acceptable one.

6.3.2 Nature of the third-party challenge

1997:

• • • • • Liberal Democrats under Paddy Ashdown performed strongly.
        • Lib Dem tactical support helped Labour secure its landslide.

2024:

• • • • • Reform UK surged, especially among 45–64 year-olds.
        • Reform gained 24% of 2019 Conservatives.
        • Lib Dems also performed strongly, but Reform was the main disruptor.

Difference:1997’s third-party challenge strengthened Labour; 2024’s fractured the Conservative vote.

6.3.3 Issue salience

1997:

• • • • • NHS, education, crime, public services, trust.

2024:

• • • • • NHS, cost of living, immigration, economy, public services.

Difference: 1997 was dominated by public service reform; 2024 by economic strain and immigration.

6.3.4 Polling dynamics

1997:

• • • • • Polls stable and accurate
        • Labour maintained a consistent lead.

2024:

• • • • • Pre-election volatility.
        • Exit poll highly accurate, but campaign polling showed late shifts.

Difference:1997 was predictable; 2024 was more volatile.

6.3.5 Party loyalty

1997:

• • • • • Labour retained most of its 1992 vote.
        • Conservatives retained a significant portion of theirs.

2024:

• • • • • Conservatives retained only 53% of their 2019 vote.
        • Reform UK gained a quarter of former Conservatives.

Difference: 2024 saw a historic collapse in Conservative loyalty..

6.4. What these elections reveal about British politics

6.4.1 Landslides Can Arise from Very Different Conditions

1997: strong leadership + modernisation + Conservative decline 2024: weak leadership + economic strain + Conservative collapse + Reform surge

6.4.2 Tactical voting is a persistent feature

Both elections show voters coordinating implicitly to block the Conservatives.

6.4.3 Leadership matters

1997: Blair strengthened Labour’s brand 2024: Labour’s brand carried Starmer

6.4.4 Third parties shape outcomes

1997: Lib Dems helped Labour 2024: Reform hurt Conservatives

6.5. Summary table: 1974 vs 1997

7. Three elections across 50 years: 1974→1997→2024

7.1. Overview

Across fifty years, three elections stand out as turning points in modern British politics: 1974, 1997, and 2024. Each followed long periods of Conservative government, each reflected deep public dissatisfaction, and each produced major shifts in party fortunes. Yet the reasons for change — and the shape of the outcomes — differed sharply.

This comparison shows how issue salience, leadership, party brand, tactical voting, and third-party dynamics evolved across half a century.

7.2. The political contexts

1974 — Crisis & instability (NOP)

• • Inflation at historic highs
  • Energy crisis (Three-Day Week)
  • Strikes and industrial conflict (“Who governs Britain?”)
  • Immigration and Europe salient
  • Two elections: February (hung parliament), October (Labour majority of 3)
  • Unpopular leaders (Heath, Wilson)
  • Dramatic Liberal surge under Jeremy Thorpe

1997 — Modernisation & renewal (MORI)

• • After 18 years of Conservative rule
  • Public desire for change
  • Conservative brand damaged (sleaze, division, Black Wednesday)
  • Blair’s Labour seen as modern, competent, safe
  • NHS and education dominant issues
  • Tactical voting against Conservatives
  • Labour landslide majority of 179

2024 — Dissatisfaction & realignment (Ipsos)

• • Record dissatisfaction with government
  • Sunak’s net satisfaction –71 (lowest ever entering an election)
  • Public services seen to have deteriorated (78% “worse”)
  • NHS, cost of living, immigration top issues
  • Reform UK surge
  • Tactical voting significant (17%)
  • Collapse of 2019 Conservative vote
  • Labour large majority

     

     

7.3. Leadership across 50 years

7.4. Issue salience across 50 years

7.9. Summary table: 1974→1997→2024

7.10. What 50 years shows us about British elections

8. How to compare elections

Prepared by Phyllis Macfarlane with help from CoPilot

2026