Politics A-level

 

POWER, RESPONSIBILITY AND LEADERSHIP

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1. Introduction

Prime Ministerial power in the UK is shaped less by constitutional rules and more by political conditions. While cabinet government, collective responsibility and parliamentary accountability remain central, the real authority of a Prime Minister depends on political resources: popularity, competence, media framing, party morale, issue ownership and cabinet unity.

The AMSR archive — especially the MORI and NOP series from the 1960s to early 2000s — provides a unique empirical record of how these factors rise and fall, and how they shape the relationship between Prime Minister and cabinet.

2. Individual vs collective responsibility: The foundations of Prime Ministerial power

British government formally operates on collective responsibility: cabinet decisions bind all ministers, and dissent requires resignation. In practice, Prime Ministers exercise individual responsibility through:

• agenda‑setting
• cabinet appointments and dismissals
• control of cabinet committees
• management of the party in Parliament
• public leadership through media

The balance between individual and collective responsibility shifts with political conditions. MORI/NOP evidence shows that Prime Ministers with high popularity, strong competence ratings and favourable media portrayal tend to dominate cabinet; Prime Ministers with low ratings or divided parties become constrained by cabinet.

3. Factors Affecting Prime Ministerial Power

3.1 Prime Minister popularity

MORI’s long‑term satisfaction series shows that Prime Minister popularity is one of the strongest predictors of cabinet authority.

• • Wilson (1964–70): high early satisfaction → strong cabinet control
  • Thatcher (1982): Falklands surge → dominance
  • Major (1992–97): collapse after Black Wednesday → cabinet rebellion
  • Blair (1997–2001): very high early satisfaction → centralised “sofa government”
  • Example Link: Representative MORI Prime Minister satisfaction trend: British Public Opinion Issue 25.02/3 2002/3 Winter – Page 15 – MORI British Public Opinion – The AMSR Online Archive

3.2 Competence ratings

Competence ratings (“Is the Prime Minister doing a good job?”) measure perceived effectiveness and often diverge from popularity.

• • Callaghan rated competent despite low popularity
  • Thatcher rated economically competent even during midterm dips
  • Brown rated more competent than Blair on economic management
  • Example link: Representative MORI report: British Public Opinion Issue 10.01 1988 January/Feburary – Page 2 – MORI British Public Opinion – The AMSR Online Archive

3.3 Media portrayal

MORI’s perceptual maps (2001–03) show how media framing shapes Prime Minister authority.

• • Blair early: “good in a crisis”, “professional”
  • Blair post‑Iraq: “inflexible”, “talks down to people”
  • Major: “weak”, “out of touch”
  • Thatcher: “strong”, “determined”, “capable”
  • Example link: Representative MORI leadership perceptual map: British Public Opinion Issue 26.02 2003 Year end – Page 5 – MORI British Public Opinion – The AMSR Online Archive

3.4 Party morale

MORI/NOP evidence repeatedly shows morale is decisive in Prime Minister–cabinet relations.

• • Example link: Representative MORI party image / morale report: British Public Opinion Issue 17.10 1994 December – Page 2 – MORI British Public Opinion – The AMSR Online Archive
  • Heath: morale collapse → cabinet dissent
  • Major: morale collapse → Maastricht rebellion
  • Blair (1997–2001): morale high → unity
  • Blair (post‑2003): morale collapse → resignations
  • Example link: Representative MORI party image / morale report: British Public Opinion Issue 17.10 1994 December – Page 2 – MORI British Public Opinion – The AMSR Online Archive

3.5 Issue ownership

MORI’s issue ownership series (1997–2003) shows how Prime Minister authority depends on which issues their party “owns”.

Labour (1997–2001) owned:

• • health
  • education
  • unemployment

Conservatives (1979–97) owned:

• • economy
  • taxation
  • law & order
  • Europe

Loss of issue ownership weakens Prime Ministers (Major after Black Wednesday; Blair after Iraq).

• • Example link: Representative MORI issue ownership report: British Public Opinion Issue 24.02 2001 March/April – Page 4 – MORI British Public Opinion – The AMSR Online Archive

 

4. Prime Minister – cabinet relations: How power shifts

Prime Ministers dominate cabinet when:

• popularity is high
• competence ratings are strong
• media framing is favourable
• party morale is buoyant
• issue ownership aligns with government priorities
• cabinet is united

Cabinet constrains Prime Ministers when:

• popularity collapses
• competence ratings fall
• media framing turns negative
• party morale declines
• issue ownership shifts
• cabinet becomes divided

MORI/NOP evidence shows these dynamics consistently across post‑war leadership.

 

5. Prime Ministerial leadership case studies (Macmillan → Cameron)

Harold Macmillan (1957–63)
Authority rested on party unity and positive media portrayal (“Supermac”). NOP recorded high public confidence. The Profumo Affair (1963) caused competence collapse and cabinet reassertion.

Harold Wilson (1964–70; 1974–76)
MORI recorded strong satisfaction early (1964–66), enabling centralised decision‑making. By 1975–76, NOP found falling satisfaction and rising cabinet dissent.

Edward Heath (1970–74)
Early competence ratings were solid, but NOP recorded collapsing confidence during miners’ strikes. Cabinet divisions weakened authority; the February 1974 election exposed limits of Prime Minister dominance.

Margaret Thatcher (1979–90)
Authority built on issue ownership (economy, law & order) and strong competence ratings. MORI’s Falklands data showed a dramatic satisfaction surge. Late‑1980s cabinet resignations and morale collapse led to removal.

James Callaghan (1976–79)
NOP found high personal competence, but Labour’s issue ownership collapsed during the Winter of Discontent. Cabinet unity weakened; collective responsibility constrained Prime Minister authority.

John Major (1990–97)
MORI recorded satisfaction collapse after Black Wednesday. Cabinet divisions over Europe and negative media portrayal (“weak”, “grey”) eroded authority.

Tony Blair (1997–2007)
(AMSR covers 1997–2003) 1997–2001: MORI recorded exceptionally high satisfaction, strong competence ratings, high morale and cabinet unity → centralised “sofa government”. 2002–03: Iraq caused satisfaction collapse, morale decline and cabinet resignations.

David Cameron (2005–16)
(AMSR has early leadership data) Early MORI polling showed rising Conservative morale and favourable media portrayal. Authority weakened during EU referendum period as cabinet divisions emerged.

 

6. Conclusion: Prime Ministerial power as a political resource

Across 1957–2003, MORI/NOP evidence shows that Prime Ministerial power is political, not constitutional. Prime Ministers dominate cabinet when popularity, competence, morale, media framing and issue ownership align. They are constrained when these conditions weaken.

The Prime Minister–cabinet relationship is dynamic, contingent and measurable — and the AMSR archive provides the most detailed empirical record of how that relationship has evolved across the post‑war period.

 

7. Linking Guidance

This page provides representative links to MORI/NOP reports. Each link illustrates the type of evidence used (e.g., perceptual maps, satisfaction trends, competence ratings). Full series and additional reports are available in the AMSR archive, mainly in the MORI BPO and NOP collections.

 

THE POWER OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET TO DICTATE EVENTS AND DETERMINE POLICY-MAKING

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1. Overview: What AMSR polling shows about Prime Ministerial power

Across the AMSR archive, one theme is clear: Prime Ministers do not exercise unlimited authority. Polling from the 1950s–2000s shows governments continually navigating public opinion, Cabinet dynamics, party divisions, international pressures, and Britain’s changing global role.

Public attitudes were rarely simple. They could be anxious (immigration), cautious (defence spending), ambivalent (Europe and the USA), volatile (Vietnam), or remarkably stable (nuclear weapons). Each pattern created a different kind of constraint on Prime Minister power.

Prime Ministers could propose policy, frame arguments, and lead strategically — but they could not ignore the electorate’s mood, the Cabinet’s internal dynamics, or the geopolitical realities of the era.

The archive reveals negotiated leadership, not unilateral control. Prime Minister power is real — but always conditional.

 

2. Thematic constraints on Prime Ministerial power

2.1 Foreign Affairs: Vietnam and Wilson

Constraint: International pressure vs domestic opinion
Wilson was caught between US expectations and strong public resistance to involvement in Vietnam. Washington wanted British troops, but 65% of the public opposed sending forces, and by 1967–68 two‑thirds disapproved of Labour’s stance.

Wilson’s refusal to commit troops shows how Prime Ministers cannot dictate foreign policy independently of public sentiment, Cabinet divisions, or Britain’s declining global influence.

Labour governments and managing foreign affairs in the 1960s: What do the polls say?

2.2 Immigration

Constraint: Strong public attitudes and political risk
In the 1960s, public opinion on immigration was anxious and often racially charged. Majorities favoured stricter controls, creating a narrow corridor for Prime Minister action.

Immigration became a policy area where Prime Ministers had very limited freedom to act. Any move perceived as too permissive or too harsh carried political risk.

Surveying public opinion in Britain towards immigration in the 1960s – AMSR

2.3 Britain’s relations with Europe and the USA

Constraint: Public ambivalence and competing strategic identities

Polling from 1969–1971 showed no clear public majority for Europe, the USA, or the Commonwealth. Support for Europe and the Commonwealth was similar; backing for the USA was lower.

Later polling (2002) shows scepticism toward US foreign policy, limiting Blair’s autonomy. Prime Ministers had to navigate competing expectations rather than impose a single strategic vision.

Surveying Britain’s relations with the EU and the USA – AMSR

2.4 Nuclear Weapons

Constraint: Long‑term, stable public attitudes rooted in national identity

AMSR polling shows attitudes to nuclear weapons were stable and resistant to change, shaped by national identity and perceptions of Britain’s global status.

Prime Ministers had limited room to innovate. They could frame policy and emphasise deterrence, but not radically expand or reduce capability without political cost.

Surveying public opinion towards Britain’s nuclear weapons – AMSR

2.5 Defence Spending

Constraint: Public scepticism and fluctuating Cold War context

Large sections of the public believed defence expenditure was too high, especially during periods of lower international tension.

Prime Ministers could not freely expand defence budgets or pursue ambitious military strategies without risking political backlash. Defence policy had to track public mood, party expectations, and geopolitical shifts.

Surveying public opinion in Britain towards defence spending – AMSR

 

CASE STUDIES: WHEN PRIME MINISTERS DRIVE POLICY

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1. Thatcher’s Early Years (1979-1982)
Prime Minister drives policy despite Cabinet resistance

Thatcher entered office with a clear ideological mission: break with the postwar consensus, cut inflation, reduce state intervention, and weaken trade unions.

She pushed through monetarist reforms despite Cabinet unease and very low public support. By 1982, she had reshaped Cabinet, strengthened No.10, and established firm internal control.

See this in-depth essay for further insight into Thatcher’s early years. 

2. Thatcher and the Falklands (1982)
Prime Minister gains exceptional authority during crisis

Before the Falklands War, Thatcher was politically weak. The invasion transformed her position overnight. Satisfaction with the government jumped from 27% to 52%, and her personal rating reached 55%.

Public opinion, media framing, and national sentiment aligned behind decisive leadership. Cabinet dissent collapsed, Parliament rallied, and No.10 became the centre of strategy.

See this in-depth essay for further insight into Thatcher and the Falklands.

3. Thatcher 1983-1984 — the Falklands aftermath

This episode shows how the Prime Minister and Cabinet can shape the policy agenda and coordinate government action, but also how their ability to dictate events is limited by Cabinet unity, party pressures, and external circumstances. The Prime Minister could steer the response, but could not fully control it.

See this in-depth essay for further insight into Thatcher and the aftermath of the Falklands

4. Blair and Kosovo (1999)
Prime Minister power expanded because public opinion aligned with leadership

Support for Britain’s involvement surged from 55% to 76% within a week. Satisfaction with Blair’s handling reached 67%.

High approval gave Blair leverage over Cabinet, Whitehall, and international partners. Cabinet unity increased because ministers could align behind a Prime Minister whose judgement was trusted.

See this in-depth essay for further insight into Blair and Kosovo. 

5. Blair and Iraq (2003)
Prime Minister drives policy despite public division

Blair pushed through the Iraq War even when public opinion and parts of Labour were strongly opposed. Despite the largest public protest in modern British history and a major rebellion among Labour MPs, Blair secured parliamentary approval.

This shows how a Prime Minister with a large majority and strong control of Cabinet can dominate policy‑making — but also how such dominance carries long‑term political costs when the policy outcome collapses.  

* Awaiting story for link (late sept)

6. Centralisation of No.10 under Thatcher and Blair
Structural increase in Prime Ministerial power

From the 1980s onwards, the machinery of government became increasingly centralised around No.10. Both Thatcher and Blair expanded the Policy Unit, strengthened the Cabinet Office, enlarged communications operations, and relied more on bilateral meetings than full Cabinet.

No.10 had more staff, more policy units, and more control over departments than ever before. This centralisation represents a structural increase in Prime Minister power — rooted in institutional change rather than personality or crisis.

See this in-depth essay for further insight into the centralisation of No. 10. * query: no sources/links in this one?

 

UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF PRIME MINISTERIAL POWER

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DEVOLUTION IN ENGLAND, SCOTLAND AND WALES: PUBLIC ATTITUDES, IDENTITY AND POLITICAL CULTURES

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1. Introduction

This resource uses AMSR polling evidence from the 1970s to the 2010s to explain how public attitudes, national identity and regional political cultures shaped the development of devolution in England, Scotland and Wales. The Archive shows that devolution did not emerge uniformly across the UK: it reflected deep, long‑standing differences in identity, trust and constitutional preferences.

The AMSR archive provides one of the richest collections of public opinion data on constitutional change in the UK. Across five decades of polling, it reveals how attitudes to identity, governance and regional distinctiveness shaped the very different paths taken by England, Scotland and Wales. These differences were not simply the result of political decisions made at Westminster; they emerged from longstanding variations in national identity, trust in institutions, and regional political cultures.

AMSR evidence shows that:

• Scotland developed strong constitutional preferences early, rooted in a politically salient national identity and sustained support for self-government.
• Wales followed a more gradualist path, shaped by dual identity and community based political culture, producing steady but moderate support for devolution.
• England, despite its size, did not develop a national devolution movement. Weak regional identity, mixed trust in new institutions and uneven regional distinctiveness meant that constitutional debates focused on regionalism rather than national self-government.

These contrasting attitudes produced the UK’s asymmetrical devolution settlement, in which Scotland and Wales gained national legislatures while England remained governed primarily through Westminster, supplemented only by uneven regional arrangements and later procedural innovations such as English Votes for English Laws (EVEL).

This detailed supplementary analysis uses AMSR polling from the 1970s to the 2010s to explain how public opinion shaped these constitutional outcomes, and why devolution developed so differently across the three nations of Great Britain.

 

2. England: Regional variation, weak identity and no national devolution

AMSR evidence shows that England did not develop a national devolution movement. Instead, attitudes were shaped by weak regional identity, mixed support for regional institutions, and low trust in new political bodies.

Key AMSR findings:

• Weak regional identity: Only 52% in the Eastern region could identify their government region; 60% in London; 97% in the North West.
• Mixed support for regional assemblies: 45% supported; 38% opposed.
• Sharp regional variation: London (+39) and the North East (+22) showed strong support; the South East (–10) showed clear opposition.
• Low trust: Only 34% believed regional politicians would be more trustworthy than Westminster MPs.
• Preference for local representation: 65% believed regional assemblies would look after local interests better than Westminster.

Constitutional impact:

Because England lacked identity mobilisation and consistent support for new institutions, it did not gain a national Parliament. Instead, Westminster introduced English Votes for English Laws (EVEL) — a procedural fix rather than a public‑driven constitutional reform. England remains the “default” level of UK governance, producing an asymmetrical constitutional structure.

For further reading and analysis on devolution in England click here.

 

3. Scotland: Strong identity, clear preferences and sustained mobilisation
Scotland’s constitutional trajectory was shaped by a politically salient national identity and long‑standing support for self‑government.

Key AMSR findings:

• Early support: In 1976, 52% supported a Scottish Assembly; only 20% preferred no change.
• Constitutional salience: Even when unemployment and inflation dominated concerns, constitutional issues remained significant.
• Referendum context (1978–79): Rising dissatisfaction with Westminster strengthened constitutional consciousness.
• Long‑term trends: Independence support fluctuated (28–37%), but devo‑max remained consistently more popular.
• Fiscal preferences: 61% believed the Scottish Government should raise most of its own revenue.

Constitutional impact:

Scotland’s strong identity and sustained mobilisation produced a Parliament with primary powers and an ongoing constitutional debate centred on independence and further devolution.

For further reading and analysis on devolution in Scotland click here.

 

4. Wales: Dual Identity, Gradualist Devolution and Community‑Centred Politics
Wales followed a more incremental constitutional path than Scotland, shaped by dual identity, community‑based political culture, and moderate but stable support for devolution. The AMSR archive — in particular the 1989 NOP Wales‑wide survey — shows that Welsh attitudes were pragmatic, locally rooted, and responsive to developments elsewhere in the UK.

Identity and political culture:

Wales exhibits a dual identity (Welsh and British), producing a political culture that is:

• community‑centred (language, local governance, cultural institutions)
• less constitutionally mobilised than Scotland
• focused on practical local control rather than symbolic national autonomy

Support for devolution:

AMSR and NOP evidence show:

• 49% favoured an elected Welsh Assembly (NOP 1989)
• 34% opposed
• Support rose to 58% if Scotland gained an Assembly first (“me too” effect)
• Support strongest among Welsh speakers (61%) and younger voters (65% of 18–34s)
• 1995 JRRT polling also showed majority support for devolution and constitutional reform

This demonstrates that Welsh support was moderate, conditional, and incremental.

Regional variation:

Wales is not politically uniform:

• North Wales: Plaid Cymru 29%, Welsh speakers 57%, Assembly support 56%
• South Wales: Labour 57%, Plaid 8%, Welsh speakers 17%
• Mid/West Wales: Labour 33%, Conservatives 32%, SLD 12%

Language and region strongly shape constitutional preferences.

Language and constitutional attitudes:

Language is a major driver of Welsh political behaviour:

• 15% speak Welsh fluently; 15% speak “a little”
• 53% of Plaid voters speak Welsh
• Welsh speakers strongly favour devolution (61% Assembly; 68% “me too” scenario)

Low salience of devolution

In the Pontypridd by‑election (1989):

• Devolution was the most important issue for only 1% of voters
• Even among Plaid voters, only 7% named it as their top issue

This contrasts sharply with Scotland, where constitutional questions were consistently salient.

The “special case” argument

NOP 1989 shows:

• 52% favoured treating Wales as a separate special case
• Only 25% favoured UK‑wide devolution including English regions
• Support for “special case” rose to 69% among Plaid voters
• Even Labour voters favoured “special case” (58%)

This reveals a distinctive Welsh constitutional preference: devolution, but on Wales’s own terms.

Constitutional impact

Wales developed an Assembly (later a Parliament) through steady, moderate support, not through high‑salience mobilisation. Its constitutional trajectory reflects a political culture that values community, continuity and incremental reform.

For further reading and analysis on devolution in Wales click here. 

 

5. Why devolution diverged: Identity, culture and constitutional preferences
AMSR evidence shows that the UK’s asymmetrical devolution settlement emerged from public attitudes, not simply political decisions.

Identity:

• Scotland: strong identity → strong constitutional preferences
• Wales: dual identity → gradualist preferences
• England: weaker regional identity → limited mobilisation

Political cultures:

• Scotland: identity‑driven, constitutional, mobilised
• Wales: community‑driven, gradualist, culturally rooted
• England: regionally varied, institutionally sceptical, identity‑light

Constitutional outcomes:

• Scotland → Parliament with primary powers
• Wales → Parliament with expanding powers
• England → no national Parliament; uneven regionalism

These differences explain why devolution developed unevenly across Great Britain.

For further reading and analysis comparing devolution across the three nations click here.

 

6. Referendums: How Voters Decide and Why Devolution Succeeds
AMSR referendum analysis (by Sir John Curtice) shows that constitutional change succeeds when:

• identity is salient
• arguments are clear
• stakes are widely understood
• mobilisation is high

High‑salience referendums (e.g., 2014 independence) produce strong argument‑linked voting. Low‑salience referendums (e.g., 2011 AV) do not. This helps explain why Scotland and Wales succeeded in 1997 — and why England never developed a comparable movement.

For further reading and analysis on referendums click here.

 

7. Summary of AMSR Insights

• England’s weak regional identity, mixed support and low trust prevented national devolution.
• Scotland’s strong identity and clear constitutional preferences produced sustained mobilisation and a powerful Parliament.
• Wales’s dual identity, language‑linked politics and gradualist culture produced incremental constitutional change.
• These differences created the UK’s asymmetrical constitutional structure.
• Referendum evidence shows that constitutional change depends on identity mobilisation, argument‑linked voting and perceived stakes.

Click on this link for a summary of AMSR findings on devolution.

 

8. Further Reading: AMSR Analysis

For detailed polling evidence, regional breakdowns, referendum analysis and full archive citations, see the links in the sections above, plus this document lists the links to AMSR sources used. 

 

 

PATTERNS OF PARTICIPATION, TURNOUT AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOUR (AMSR EVIDENCE, 1945-2024)

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1. Introduction: Participation in a representative democracy

Democracy in the UK depends on citizens participating through voting, campaigning, discussion, and engagement with political information. The AMSR Archive provides a unique long‑term record of how participation has changed since 1945, revealing shifts in turnout, volatility, late decision‑making, and the ways in which voters respond to political campaigns. These patterns show how democratic participation has evolved from a stable two‑party system to a more volatile, multi‑party environment in which voters are more willing to switch allegiance, abstain, or decide late.

2. Patterns of participation across the post‑war period

2.1 Turnout and electoral engagement

Turnout fluctuated significantly across the post‑war decades, reflecting changes in party competition, campaign intensity, and public interest.

• • 1945–1950s: Participation was high and stable. Elections were dominated by the two main parties, and most voters made early decisions.
  • 1970s: Participation became more volatile. The February 1974 election saw 3 million more voters than in 1970, and 4 million more voted Liberal, showing a dramatic rise in multi‑party engagement.
  • Late deciders increased: In 1974, 24% of voters made up their minds during the campaign, and even excluding Liberal voters, 18% still decided during the campaign — a significant rise in late engagement.
    “Nearly 1 in 5 Liberal voters did not decide to vote Liberal until the last few days of the campaign.” (NOP Political Bulletin, 1974)

These figures show that participation is not simply about turnout; it is also about when voters decide and how they engage with campaigns.

2.2 Electoral volatility

The AMSR Archive shows a clear rise in electoral volatility from the late 1960s onwards.

• • Between 1966 and 1970, public opinion shifted from a 20% Labour lead to a 20% Conservative lead.
  • By the 1970s, volatility was firmly established:
    “NOP found that 28% of all respondents sometimes change their party allegiance between elections.” (NOP, 1974)

Volatility is a key pattern of participation: voters are more willing to switch parties, abstain, or vote tactically.

2.3 Late Decision‑Making and Campaign Effects

The AMSR evidence shows that campaigns matter because many voters decide late.

• • In 1974, 1 in 5 voters made their decision during the campaign.
  • Late deciders were disproportionately Liberal voters, contributing to the difficulty of forecasting their final vote.
  • Late swings were decisive in several elections, including 1970, where a late shift to the Conservatives overturned Labour’s apparent lead.

Late decision‑making is a form of participation: voters engage with campaign information, media coverage, and party messages before choosing.

3. Forms of participation

3.1 Voting as the primary form of participation

Voting remains the central form of democratic participation. AMSR evidence shows:

• • High engagement in early post‑war elections.
  • Increased abstention among younger voters in 1970.
    “Labour lost more of their 1966 strength through abstention than did the Tories… younger voters were more likely to abstain.” (NOP, 1970)

Voting behaviour reflects broader social and political trends, including generational differences and economic concerns.

3.2 Strategic Voting

Strategic voting emerges clearly in AMSR evidence:

• • In 1974, late switches from Liberal to Labour in key marginals affected the final result.
    “The polls over‑estimate of the Liberal vote… may have been the result of late changes from a Liberal intention to a Labour vote.” (NOP, 1974)

Strategic voting is a form of participation shaped by expectations, media coverage, and perceptions of party strength.

3.3 Engagement with campaign information

Participation also includes exposure to political information:

• • In 1970, 62% of the public remembered seeing polls; 71% recalled seeing them on television.
  • In 1974, 58% claimed to have seen poll results during the campaign.

This shows that participation includes information consumption, not just voting.

4. How participation has changed over time

4.1 From stability to volatility

• • 1940s–1950s: Stable two‑party competition, early decision‑making, limited volatility.
  • 1960s–1970s: Rising volatility, late swings, multi‑party competition, increased abstention.
  • 1980s–2010s: More polls, more media coverage, more tactical voting, more late deciders.

Participation has become more complex and more responsive to campaign dynamics.

4.2 The Role of Information in Participation

The AMSR Archive shows that participation is shaped by:

• • exposure to polls
  • media reporting
  • campaign intensity
  • perceptions of party momentum
  • economic concerns (e.g., cost of living in 1970)

Participation is not static; it is shaped by the information environment.

 

YOUNG PEOPLE AND DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION: WHY DO YOUNG PEOPLE NOT VOTE? (AMSR EVIDENCE)

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A consistent pattern across the AMSR Archive is that young people participate less in elections than older voters. This is not a recent development: it appears in polling from the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2010s, and in contemporary Vox Pops. The reasons are structural, behavioural, and demographic — and they help explain why extending the vote to 16–17 year olds may have limited immediate impact unless accompanied by wider support.

 

1. Lower certainty of voting

The Harris Poll (1970) shows that younger voters were significantly less likely to say they were “absolutely certain” to vote. This pattern strengthens with age: older voters express higher certainty, younger voters lower certainty. This is one of the most stable findings in the Archive.

“Young people were less likely to be ‘absolutely certain’ they would go out to vote.” (Harris Poll, 1970)

Lower certainty → higher abstention.

2. Late decision‑making

Young people decide later, and late deciders are less likely to vote.

NOP’s 1974 analysis found:

• 24% of voters made up their minds during the campaign
• excluding Liberal voters, still 18% decided late
• younger voters were disproportionately represented among late deciders

Late decision‑making is a form of participation, but it is also associated with higher abstention and greater volatility.

3. Higher volatility and weaker partisan identity

Young voters have weaker long‑term political identities because they have lived through fewer elections. They are more likely to switch parties, change their minds, or abstain.

NOP found: “28% of respondents sometimes change their party allegiance between elections.”

This volatility is highest among younger voters, who have not yet developed stable partisan habits.

4. Lower political knowledge and fewer voting habits

Research notes that younger voters: “have less knowledge and pattern in their voting due to not having gone through as many elections to form a set opinion.”

Voting is a habit. Older voters have decades of experience; younger voters are still forming (or not forming) that habit.

5. Harder to reach through traditional campaigning

The AMSR evidence from 2015 shows that younger voters are under‑represented in traditional polling and harder for parties to reach: “Fewer people are likely to answer or have a landline phone, speak to pollsters on the doorstep or be representative as a bloc.”

This reduces the effectiveness of mobilisation efforts and makes young voters less visible in campaign data.

6. Participation beyond voting

Research emphasises that young people may be politically active even if they do not vote:

• social issue campaigns
• protests
• online activism
• party membership
• community engagement

“Being interested in politics and being active in society are not limited by voting intention.”

This distinction is crucial: participation does not equal voting.

7. Demographic weight: Young people are a small share of the electorate

John Curtice notes that adding 16–17 year olds will not dramatically change election outcomes: “Not a lot – there are very few of them.”

Their small demographic size means:

• parties invest less in targeting them
• they feel less politically courted
• low engagement becomes self‑reinforcing

This is a structural reason for low turnout.

8. In summary: Why young people do not vote

AMSR evidence shows that young people vote less because:

• they are less certain they will vote
• they decide later
• they have weaker partisan identities
• they are more volatile
• they have fewer voting habits
• they are harder to reach
• they are a small demographic group
• they participate in other ways instead

These patterns have been consistent for over fifty years.

For further exploration of young voters, including 16–17 year olds, demographic impact, international comparisons, and Vox Pops evidence, see this in-depth essay by Alex Tan: Young People and the Vote in Britain: Using the AMSR to Improve Demographic Understanding.

9. Conclusion: Participation in a modern democracy

The AMSR evidence demonstrates that participation in UK democracy has evolved from stable, predictable voting patterns to a more volatile, information‑driven form of engagement. Turnout, late decision‑making, strategic voting, and exposure to campaign information all shape how citizens participate. These patterns reveal a democracy in which voters are increasingly responsive to campaigns, media coverage, and perceived momentum — setting the stage for the next chapter on Media Influence.

We have data from all post war UK elections that will help you explore the role and impact of the media in politics. View and download our document summarising data held in the AMSR on ‘Polling in UK Elections since 1945’.

This shows how democratic participation interacts with political culture, identity, and constitutional change. Patterns of participation help explain why voters respond differently to political campaigns, referendums, and constitutional debates across the UK.

 

THE WIDER POLITICAL CONTEXT OF UK ELECTIONS (1945-2024)

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Across eight decades, AMSR evidence shows that UK elections are shaped by the political, economic and social climate of their time. These contexts influence party strategies, issue salience, leadership perceptions, and electoral outcomes.

• 1945: Labour landslide; welfare state building; early polling mistrusted but accurate.
• 1950–51: austerity, rationing, rearmament; newspapers misinterpreted polls; Labour won more votes but Conservatives won more seats.
• 1955–59: rising living standards; early TV coverage; polls stirred interest and participation.

Click on this link to read further analysis of the 1945 – 1959 elections.

 

1960s: Modernisation and stable two-party competition

• 1964–66: modernisation vs tradition; Liberal revival; heavy media use of polls; generally accurate predictions.
• Late 1960s: public opinion became more volatile, foreshadowing the instability of the 1970s.

Click on this link to read further analysis of the 1960s elections.

 

1970s: Volatility, crisis and industrial conflict

• 1970: surprise Conservative victory; late swing; youth abstention; classic polling failure.
• Feb 1974: miners’ strike; Three‑Day Week; hung parliament; polls overestimated Liberals.
• Oct 1974: narrow Labour majority; polls overestimated Labour lead.

1979: Winter of Discontent; accurate polls; start of Thatcher era.

Click on this link to read further analysis of the 1970s elections.

 

1980s: Idealogical realignment and Thatcher dominance

• 1983: Conservative landslide; Labour division; Alliance momentum; heavy polling; high accuracy.
• 1987: third Conservative victory; sophisticated marginals polling; stable leadership perceptions.

Click on this link to read further analysis of the 1980s elections.  

 

1990s: Economic turbulence, polling failure and New Labour transformation

• 1992: unexpected Conservative victory; late swing; shy Tories; turnout effects; major polling failure.
• 1997: Labour landslide; professionalised campaign; stable polls; Blair’s strong leadership ratings.

Click on this link to read further analysis of the 1990s elections.  

 

2000s: Public service reform, Iraq War and trust decline

• 2001: Labour second term; high churn despite low volatility; accurate polls.
• 2005: Iraq fallout; declining trust; Labour third term.

Click on this link to read further analysis of the 2000s elections. 

 

2010s: Fragmentation, austerity, nationalism and Brexit

• 2010: financial crisis; expenses scandal; first leaders’ debates; hung parliament; coalition formation.
• 2015: austerity; SNP surge; major polling failure; exit poll success; Conservative majority.
• 2017: Brexit polarisation; late Labour surge; youth turnout underestimated; hung parliament.
• 2019: Brexit realignment; Conservative landslide; collapse of Labour’s Red Wall; accurate polls.

Click on this link to read further analysis of the 2010s elections. 

 

2020s: Fragmentation, austerity, nationalism and Brexit

• 2024: economic insecurity; NHS pressures; Reform UK surge; anti‑Conservative tactical voting; Labour landslide.

Click on this link to read further analysis of the 2020s elections. 

 

 

CAMPAIGN TECHNIQUES USED BY POLITICAL PARTIES (1945-2024)

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1940s–1950s: Press‑based campaigning

Newspapers framed expectations; early polls were mistrusted and often misreported.

1960s–1970s: Television era

TV increased exposure; polls became central to coverage; misreporting was common, especially in 1970.

1980s: Poll‑driven campaigns

Newspapers used polls intensively; telephone polling emerged; Alliance campaigned on momentum and tactical voting.

1990s: Professionalisation

New Labour pioneered strategic communications, rapid rebuttal, message discipline and targeted constituency campaigning.

2000s: Targeting and early digital

Local campaigning intensified; early social media use emerged.

2010s: Digital campaigning and micro‑targeting

Leaders’ debates (2010); social media mobilisation (2017); micro‑targeting and message discipline (2019).

2020s: Low‑risk messaging and fragmentation

Labour emphasised stability; Reform UK used aggressive digital mobilisation; Liberal Democrats used hyper‑targeted constituency strategies.

 

 

VOTING BEHAVIOUR

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1. Short-Term Factors

Leadership effects: Leadership ratings consistently shape outcomes: Thatcher strong (1983, 1987); Foot weak (1983); Major trusted but overshadowed (1992); Blair exceptionally strong (1997, 2001); Cameron stable vs Miliband doubts (2015); May’s ratings collapse (2017); Johnson decisive on Brexit (2019); Starmer competence advantage (2024).

Campaign effects: Campaigns can shift opinion dramatically: 1970 late swing; 1992 Sheffield rally; 1997 message discipline; 2017 Labour surge; 2024 anti‑Conservative tactical coordination.

Issue salience: Dominant issues vary by era: 1945 welfare; 1970s cost of living; 1997–2001 NHS/education; 2010 economy/trust; 2015 austerity/immigration; 2017 Brexit + NHS; 2019 Brexit; 2024 cost of living + NHS.

Late swings: A recurring AMSR finding: 1970, 1992, 2017, 2019.

Tactical voting: Varies by election: Limited in 1980s; significant in 2010; anti‑Labour in 2015; anti‑Conservative in 2017; fragmented Remain tactical voting in 2019; widespread anti‑Conservative tactical voting in 2024.

2. Long-Term Factors

Class de-alignment: Class becomes a weaker predictor: 1980s Labour’s working‑class base fractures; 1997 Labour cross‑class coalition; 2019 Conservative working‑class surge.

Partisan de-alignment: Long‑term loyalties weaken: More switching; 2001 record churn; 2010–2024 multiparty volatility.

Electoral volatility: Volatility increases: 1970s, 1992, 2017.

Generational change: Younger voters lean left but turnout varies: 1970 youth abstention; 2017 youth surge; 2024 youth turnout decline.

Regional patterns: Distinct political cultures: Scotland identity‑driven; Wales gradualist; England regionally varied; 2015–2024 SNP dominance then decline; Red Wall realignment.

 

 

GENERAL ELECTION CASE STUDIES (1945-2024) (Official certified results only)

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1945–1959 Labour landslide (1945); narrow wins (1950, 1951); Conservative stability (1955, 1959).

1964–1970 Close contests (1964); Labour landslide (1966); surprise Conservative win (1970).

1974–1979 Hung parliament (Feb 1974); narrow Labour majority (Oct 1974); Conservative win (1979).

1983–1987 Conservative landslide (1983); third Conservative victory (1987).

1992–2001 Unexpected Conservative win (1992); Labour landslides (1997, 2001).

2005–2010 Labour third term (2005); hung parliament + coalition (2010).

2015–2019 Conservative majority (2015); hung parliament (2017); Conservative landslide (2019).

2024 Labour landslide; Conservative collapse; Liberal Democrat surge; Reform UK rise.

Comparing elections
One of the Archive’s major supporters, IPSOS, has compiled a review of the 2024 General Election, including some useful comparisons to 1997, and over time.The report is highly relevant for the A-Level Politics curriculum, which includes the study of three UK elections including 1997.

Click here to download IPSOS’ ‘How the voters voted in the 2024 election’. The estimates are based on people’s answers to a post-election survey immediately after polling day and explore differences in voting patterns by gender, age, social class and more

You can also click this link to read the AMSR article ‘How to compare elections – an example using AMSR resources’   (* Link not yet posted)

You may also be interested to read our article “Why polls go wrong” (* Link not yet posted) about the accuracy, and failures, of polling over time.

 

 

REFERENDUMS (1975-2016)

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1975 EEC Referendum Strong “Yes”; economic framing; heavy media use of polls.

1997 Scottish & Welsh Referendums Polls accurate; media misreporting widespread; decisive Scottish result; narrow Welsh result.

2011 AV Referendum Low salience; reform rejected.

2014 Scottish Independence (pre‑referendum polling) High salience; identity mobilisation; polls tracked constitutional preferences accurately.

2016 EU Referendum High salience; identity mobilisation; polling challenges; major constitutional impact.

Click on this link to read further analysis of UK referendums 1975- 2016. * Link not yet posted

 

 

THE INFLUENCE OF THE MEDIA IN UK ELECTIONS: ROLE, IMPACT, BIAS AND PERSUASION (AMSR EVIDENCE 1945-2024)

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1. Introduction: Media and Democratic Politics

The media plays a central role in shaping political engagement in the UK. Newspapers, television, and later online platforms have influenced expectations, campaign tone, party morale, and voter behaviour. The AMSR Archive provides a detailed historical record of how media reporting of opinion polls has shaped elections since 1945. This evidence shows that media influence is not simply about reporting numbers: it is about how polls are framed, believed, doubted, misreported, and interpreted — and how these interpretations affect political behaviour.

Opinion polls: Polls become central to election coverage from the 1960s onwards.

Poll reporting: Media often misreports polls: 1970 widespread misreporting; 1997 Scottish devolution polls misreported; 2015 flawed polls over‑interpreted.

Poll accuracy: Polls usually accurate, but failures occur when interviewing finishes too early, late swings occur, turnout differs, shy voter effects distort samples, or samples are unrepresentative.

Poll failures: Classic failures: 1970, 1992, 2015.

Media misinterpretation: 1992 broadcasters misinterpreted exit polls; 2015 exit poll shocked commentators.

Polls shaping expectations: Polls influence campaign tone, party morale, tactical voting debates, and perceptions of momentum.

Debate on banning polls: Recurring debate after failures; UK governments consistently reject bans.

 

2. The Role and Impact of the Media

2.1 Media as a source of political information
From the 1940s onwards, newspapers and later television became the primary channels through which voters encountered polling data and campaign narratives.

• In 1970, 62% of the public remembered seeing polls, and 71% recalled seeing them on television.
  “Polls dominated the 1970 election campaign reporting.” (AMSR)

This shows that media exposure to polls was widespread and influential.

2.2 Media shaping expectations and campaign tone
Media reporting often shaped public expectations about who was likely to win:

• In 1959, polling results published in newspapers “encouraged the Labour party and shook up the Tories.”
• Stock markets reacted to poll coverage:
  “Stock prices fell on those mornings when opinion polls showed a decline in the Tory lead.”

Media influence extended beyond voters to political elites and financial markets.

2.3 Media as a source of political information
Television and newspaper coverage helped stimulate interest and participation:

• Butler and Rose (1960) noted that television and polls “stir up interest, and hence participation in the election.”

This is a direct link between media exposure and democratic engagement.

 

3. Media Influence Between Elections

3.1 Long-term volatility and media narratives
The AMSR Archive shows that media coverage contributes to long‑term shifts in public opinion:

• Between 1966 and 1970, public opinion swung from a 20% Labour lead to a 20% Conservative lead, a shift widely discussed in the press.
• Media narratives about party leadership, economic conditions, and campaign competence shaped expectations long before polling day.

3.2 Morale effect upon parties
Media reporting of polls affected party morale:

• In 1959, declining Tory leads in the press “shook up the Tories”, influencing campaign strategy.
• In 1970, misleading press reports created false confidence in Labour’s position.

3.3 Media and market reactions
The AMSR Archive shows that media coverage contributes to long‑term shifts in public opinion:

• In 1959, the City reacted to poll results, demonstrating media influence beyond politics.

Media influence between elections is therefore structural, not episodic.

 

4. Media Bias

4.1 Misreporting and selective publication
The AMSR Archive contains extensive evidence of media bias in reporting polls:

• In 1970, newspapers “rarely gave interviewing dates, hardly ever reported ‘Don’t Knows’, seldom offered breakdowns of top line figures, and showed little interest in issues.”
• Headlines frequently exaggerated statistically insignificant changes.

This is classic media bias: selective reporting that distorts public understanding.

4.2 Calling the wrong winner
Several newspapers repeatedly miscalled election outcomes:

• The Daily Express incorrectly predicted Conservative victories in 1950, 1964, and 1966.
• In 1951, all four polls wrongly forecast a Conservative popular vote victory.

These errors were amplified by media reporting, shaping public expectations.

4.3 Over-reporting trends
Media bias often involved overstating trends:

• In February 1974, most people who had seen polls remembered only that “the Conservative party was ahead”, even though the final result was extremely close.

Media bias simplifies complex data into dramatic narratives.

 

5. Media Persuasion

5.1 Bandwagon and underdog effects
The AMSR evidence shows that polls can influence voter behaviour:

• Polls in 1959 and 1970 stirred interest and participation, consistent with bandwagon effects.
• In 1974, late switches from Liberal to Labour suggest underdog dynamics in marginals.

5.2 Strategic voting driven by media coverage
Media reporting of close contests encouraged tactical voting:

• In 1974, late changes from Liberal intention to Labour vote were linked to campaign information and poll coverage.
  “The polls over‑estimate of the Liberal vote… may have been the result of late changes from a Liberal intention to a Labour vote.”

5.3 Late swings and media influence
Late swings are a form of persuasion:

• In 1970, a late swing to the Conservatives overturned Labour’s apparent lead — a shift detected only in polls conducted close to polling day.

Media coverage of polls can therefore influence voter behaviour directly and indirectly.

 

6. Conclusion: Media influence in a modern democracy

The AMSR Archive shows that media influence in UK elections is multifaceted. Newspapers and television shape expectations, campaign tone, and participation. Media bias affects how voters interpret polling data, while media persuasion influences late swings, strategic voting, and perceptions of momentum. Between elections, media narratives contribute to long‑term volatility and shifts in party support. Together, these patterns demonstrate that media influence is central to understanding modern British electoral behaviour.

1. Introduction

The AMSR archive contains rich evidence on party competition, electoral performance, leadership perceptions and public attitudes. However, it does not contain the ideological or origins‑based material required to teach the full AQA content for the three major parties.

This resource therefore provides:

Part A — Major Parties (Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrats)

Partial coverage only Archive‑based insights into party development, electoral fortunes and public attitudes.

 

Part B — Minor Parties (SNP, Plaid Cymru, Green Party)

Full AQA coverage Electoral performance, regional variation, issue salience, competition and voter profiles — all strongly supported by AMSR evidence.

 

2. Part A – Major Parties

2.1 Conservative Party – Archive-based Insights

Post‑war prosperity and Conservative appeal
NOP polling from the early 1960s shows how economic optimism shaped Conservative fortunes. The improving economic situation and “additional spending power in people’s pockets” helped restore confidence in the party.

Issue salience and party competition
In 1963, NOP found Conservative policies preferred on Education, Nuclear Defence and Modernisation, while Labour led on Health, Housing and the Cost of Living — issues voters considered most important.

Working‑class Conservatism
MRS Conference Papers (1992) discuss the paradox of Labour losing elections despite manual workers being the largest class. Conservatives attracted working‑class votes through social deference and “embourgeoisement”.

Electoral fluctuations
Across the 1960s–1980s, NOP polling shows cycles of Conservative recovery and decline linked to economic conditions, leadership perceptions, issue salience and competition from Liberals and later the SDP/Alliance.

 

2.2 Labour Party – Archive-based Insights

New Labour transformation
The archive provides evidence on Labour’s reinvention under Tony Blair:

• • Clause IV reform
  • marketing‑driven strategy
  • focus on C1/C2 floating voters
  • “Treating voters as customers”
  • Blair’s leadership image as a “charismatic chairman”

Policy pledges and early government activity
New Labour’s early period was marked by rapid initiative: Queen’s Speech, emergency budget, Welfare to Work / New Deal, modernising Britain theme.

Public attitudes to Labour policies
Polling shows declining confidence in Labour’s NHS policies (1998), mixed views on welfare‑to‑work reforms, and strong support for some 2001 policy proposals (rail renationalisation, NHS use of private hospitals, paid paternity leave).

Electoral performance
The archive captures Labour’s landslide victories (1997, 2001) and the public mood surrounding them.

 

2.3 Liberal Party / SDP / Alliance / Liberal Democrats – Archive-based Insights

Liberal revival and leadership
NOP polling from the 1960s–1970s shows fluctuating Liberal fortunes, leadership perceptions (Thorpe, Steel), and moments of dramatic revival.

Rise of the SDP and the Alliance
Archive evidence shows the SDP attracting support equally from Conservative and Labour voters, the Alliance being “greater than the sum of its parts”, leadership recognition problems, and student support for the Alliance.

Electoral volatility
The Liberals/SDP/Alliance experienced rapid rises and falls linked to dissatisfaction with the major parties, issue salience and leadership dynamics.

A separate supplementary page preserves all archive‑based material on the major parties, including leadership and historical development evidence (such as the Thatcher polling), which sits outside the full AQA Political Parties requirements. Click here to read the article. * Link not yet available

 

3. Part B – Minor Parties

3.1 Scottish National Party (SNP)

Origins, Identity and Core Purpose
The SNP’s modern identity is built around Scottish self‑government, but the archive shows its support base has historically been heterogeneous, combining longstanding nationalists with voters motivated by political events, dissatisfaction with Labour, and reactions to UK‑wide policy changes.

In the 1988 Govan by‑election, only 27% of SNP voters had backed the party previously, while 74% were former Labour voters — demonstrating the party’s ability to mobilise tactical switchers.

Electoral Support and Voter Profile

The 1988 Govan By‑Election
The SNP won 49% of the vote. The swing was driven by Labour defections, younger voters concerned about the Poll Tax, and candidate personality.

Issue‑Based Support
Across 1988–2012, SNP support correlates with opposition to UK‑wide policies, perceived underrepresentation at Westminster, positive evaluations of SNP leadership, and support for greater autonomy.

Independence and Constitutional Change
Independence support fluctuates (28–41% across 2008–2012). Devo‑max consistently outpolls independence.

Leadership and Party Image
Alex Salmond’s satisfaction ratings (49–62%) correlate with higher SNP voting intention and turnout.

Turnout
SNP supporters are high‑turnout voters (76% “certain to vote”).

Summary
The archive shows a party capable of rapid growth through Labour defections, strong leadership effects, fluctuating independence sentiment, consistent support for greater autonomy, and high turnout.

3.2 Plaid Cymru

Plaid Cymru advocates greater Welsh autonomy and, for some supporters, independence. The archive provides rich evidence on Plaid’s electoral performance and the cultural factors shaping its support.

Electoral Performance and Regional Variation
Plaid’s support is highly regionalised:

• • North Wales: 29%
  • Mid/West Wales: 13%
  • South Wales: 8%

Support is dramatically higher among Welsh speakers (43% vs 9%).

Competition with Other Parties
Plaid competes most directly with Labour. Switching analysis shows Plaid often gains from Labour voters. In Pontypridd, Plaid attracted Labour defectors, undecided voters and former Alliance voters.

Issue Salience
Devolution was named as the most important issue by only 1% of voters (7% among Plaid voters).

Attitudes to Devolution
Support for an Assembly reached:

• • 49% overall
  • 61% among Welsh speakers
  • 58% under the “Me too” scenario
  • 70% among Plaid voters

Summary
Plaid’s electoral performance illustrates how identity, language and regional culture shape party competition in Wales.

3.3 The Green Party

Emergence and Context
The Green Party’s rise in 1989 occurred during Conservative unpopularity, collapse of the SDP–SLD Alliance, and rising environmental salience.

Electoral Performance
European Elections 1989:

• • Pre‑campaign: 2%
  • Actual: 15%
  • July NOP poll: 10%

One of the most dramatic minor‑party surges in modern UK politics.

Social Profile
Higher support among younger voters, ABC1s, and urban areas.

Party Image (MORI)
Greens associated with:

• • “having sensible policies”
  • “understanding the problems facing Britain”
  • “extreme” (radical)
  • social‑justice attributes similar to Labour

Greens reshape the perceptual map, occupying the radical pole.

Why the Greens Succeeded

• • collapse of the Alliance
  • low salience of Europe
  • rising environmental concern
  • Conservative unpopularity
  • positive issue‑focused campaign

Why They Did Not Break Through Long‑Term

• • faint image
  • low awareness
  • structural barriers (FPTP)
  • perceived extremity

Impact on the Party System
Greens reshape competition: Labour becomes a centre party; Greens take over the radical left space; Conservatives lose key image attributes.

3.4 Other Parties: SDP

Students may also like to investigate AMSR BOOK 3 : Researching the Public: Post-war policy, Politics and Polling : Researching the public: post-war politics, policy and polling – Page 1 – Research History – The AMSR Online Archive which includes a chapter on the SDP  Researching the others: outside the two-party system – Page 3 – Research History – The AMSR Online Archive

Or click on this link to read a supplementary article on minor parties. * Link not yet available

 

4. Links to Sources Used – Minor Parties

SNP

Link to extended material: For a fuller exploration of identity, devolution attitudes and regional voting patterns, see the AMSR’s Scotland polling collection.

• NOP Political, Social, Economic Review Issue no.73 (1988) NOP Political, Social, Economic Review Issue no.73 1988 December – Page 4 – NOP Reports – The AMSR Online Archive
• Polls on Scotland, 2005–2012 (MORI/TNS) Polls on Scotland, 2005-2012 – Page 1 – Opinion Poll Reports – The AMSR Online Archive
• WAPOR Conference Papers (1999) WAPOR 52nd Conference (Paris, France), September 1999. Conference papers – Page 124 – Conference Papers other than Market Research Society – The AMSR Online Archive
• Polls: Voting Intentions and Related Issues of Public Interest (2013) Polls: voting intentions and related issues of public interest 2013 – Page 11 – Opinion Poll Reports – The AMSR Online Archive

 

Plaid Cymru

Link to extended material: For a fuller exploration of Welsh identity, devolution attitudes and regional voting patterns, see the AMSR’s Wales polling collection.

• NOP Political, Social, Economic Review Issue no.84 1991 March – Page 13 – NOP Reports – The AMSR Online Archive
• NOP Political, Social, Economic Review Issue no.76 (1989) NOP Political, Social, Economic Review Issue no.76 1989 July – Page 3 – NOP Reports – The AMSR Online Archive
• MORI British Public Opinion Issue 11.07 (1989) NOP Political, Social, Economic Review Issue no.74 1989 March – Page 4 – NOP Reports – The AMSR Online Archive
• NOP Political, Social, Economic Review Issue no.73 (1988) NOP Political, Social, Economic Review Issue no.73 1988 December – Page 7 – NOP Reports – The AMSR Online Archive
• NOP Political, Social, Economic Review Issue no.74 (1989) NOP Political, Social, Economic Review Issue no.74 1989 March – Page 1 – NOP Reports – The AMSR Online Archive
• NOP Political, Social, Economic Review Issue no.84 (1991) NOP Political, Social, Economic Review Issue no.84 1991 March – Page 13 – NOP Reports – The AMSR Online Archive
• Polls on Wales, 1998–2012 Polls on Wales, 1998-2012 – Page 21 – Opinion Poll Reports – The AMSR Online Archive

 

Green Party

Link to extended material: For a fuller exploration of the Green Party, see the AMSR’s polling collection.

• NOP Political, Social, Economic Review Issue no.76 (1989) NOP Political, Social, Economic Review Issue no.76 1989 July – Page 3 – NOP Reports – The AMSR Online Archive
• MORI British Public Opinion Issue 11.07 (1989) British Public Opinion Issue 11.07 1989 September – Page 3 – MORI British Public Opinion – The AMSR Online Archive

1. Introduction

This section presents AMSR polling evidence on UK attitudes to Europe from the 1960s to the early 1990s, providing the long‑term historical context for Britain’s relationship with the EU prior to the 2016 referendum.

AQA requires students to understand how the European Union shaped UK politics, public opinion, party competition and policymaking. The AMSR archive provides unusually rich evidence on public attitudes to Europe from the 1960s to the early 1990s — long before the 2016 referendum — showing that Euroscepticism, party division and public uncertainty are not new phenomena.

This section uses AMSR NOP and MORI polling to trace how attitudes evolved and how EU membership influenced UK politics and policy.

 

2. Early attitudes to the Common Market (1960s)

1967 NOP evidence: Early division and uncertainty

NOP polling in 1967 shows that attitudes to joining the Common Market were already divided:

• 52% favoured trying to join
• 26% opposed
• Opposition included 20% of Labour supporters

NOP noted that byelections were likely to produce antiMarket candidates, indicating early political mobilisation around Europe.

This is one of the earliest signs of Eurosceptic sentiment in the UK.

 

3. Declining Support after Entry (1973-1975

1973 NOP evidence: Falling approval

By October 1973 — shortly after Britain joined the EEC — support had fallen sharply:

• Only one third approved of membership
• Support among Conservatives fell from 59% (June) to 50%
• Half the electorate blamed the Common Market for inflation
• A quarter said EEC membership was the main cause of rising prices

This shows that economic concerns — especially inflation — were central to early Euroscepticism.

1975 Referendum context (AMSR background)

AMSR’s wider archive shows that the 1975 referendum was shaped by:

• economic arguments
• sovereignty concerns
• party division (Labour split; Conservatives mostly proEurope)

The referendum produced a strong “Yes”, but the polling evidence shows that support was fragile and heavily issue driven.

 

4. The 1980s: Deepening division and rising Euroscepticism

1982 NOP Evidence: Withdrawal Support

By 1982, NOP found:

• 45% favoured immediate withdrawal
• 44% opposed
• Conservatives strongly opposed withdrawal
• Labour voters strongly favoured withdrawal
• Alliance voters were evenly split

Two in three voters wanted a referendum before any decision — including 78% of Labour voters.

This shows:

• Europe was already a crossparty cleavage
• Labour was the more Eurosceptic party in the early 1980s
• The idea of referendums on Europe has deep historical roots

1984 Gallup Evidence: Europewide scepticism about Britain

A Gallup poll across the EEC found:

• One in four EEC citizens wanted Britain out
• Support for Britain leaving was highest in France (41%) and Luxembourg (38%)

This indicates that Britain’s relationship with Europe was mutually uneasy, not just domestically contested.

5. Late 1980s: Europe as a foreign policy and identity issue

1988 NOP Evidence: Competing Visions of Britain’s Role

NOP found:

• 43% thought Britain had more influence via the US relationship
• 47% thought Britain had more influence via Europe
• 59% said European NATO members should spend more on defence
• 31% believed Thatcher’s antifederalist speeches would isolate Britain
• 47% supported a common European currency
• 48% opposed
• Only 25% wanted more power for the European Parliament; 67% opposed

This shows:

• Europe was seen as a strategic choice (US vs EU)
• Thatcher’s Euroscepticism was divisive
• Support for deeper integration (currency, EP powers) was limited

1989 Gallup evidence: Growing European identity

Gallup found:

• 55% said EC membership was a good thing
• 18% said bad
• 23% neither
• 58% said environmental protection should be decided at EC level
• 62% thought their children would feel more European

This is one of the strongest AMSR indicators of European identity among UK voters.

 

6. Early 1990s: Europe as a source of party conflict

1990 MORI Evidence: Cabinet divisions and currency debates

MORI reported:

• Geoffrey Howe’s resignation (1990) was the third major Cabinet casualty over Europe
• Even Conservative MPs showed higher support for a single European currency than Thatcher expected
• Europe was a major source of internal Conservative conflict

This period marks the beginning of the long Conservative divide over Europe that shaped:

• Major’s government
• Cameron’s referendum pledge
• Brexit politics

 

7. The impact of the EU on UK politics

7.1 Party competition

AMSR evidence shows that Europe has been a crossparty cleavage since the 1960s:

• • Labour was more Eurosceptic in the 1970s–1980s
  • Conservatives became more Eurosceptic from the late 1980s onwards
  • The Liberal Democrats consistently supported integration
  • Europe shaped leadership contests (Thatcher, Major, Cameron)
  • Europe shaped party splits (SDP, UKIP, Brexit Party)

7.2 Leadership and cabinet stability

Europe contributed to:

• • Cabinet resignations (Lawson, Ridley, Howe)
  • Leadership challenges (Thatcher, Major)
  • Party fragmentation (UKIP, Brexit Party)

7.3 Electoral behaviour

Europe influenced:

• • tactical voting (proEurope tactical voting in 1997; antiEurope tactical voting in 2015–2019)
  • third party surges (SDP, UKIP, Brexit Party)
  • referendum turnout and mobilisation (1975, 2016)

7.4 Public opinion

AMSR shows long-term patterns:

• • early support for joining (1960s)
  • declining support after entry (1973–75)
  • withdrawal support in early 1980s
  • mixed attitudes to integration (currency, EP powers)
  • rising European identity in late 1980s
  • deepening partybased division in early 1990s

7.5 Policy making

EU membership shaped UK policy in:

• • environmental regulation (1989 Gallup: majority wanted EClevel decisions)
  • competition law and market regulation
  • workers’ rights
  • agriculture and fisheries (CAP, CFP)
  • trade policy
  • consumer protection
  • regional development funding

AMSR polling shows that voters often linked EU membership to:

• • inflation (1973)
  • prices
  • sovereignty
  • Britain’s global role
  • defence cooperation

 

8. Why this section matters for A-Level Politics students

This AMSR based EU section helps students:

• understand longterm Euroscepticism
• analyse party division over Europe
• explain how EU membership shaped UK policy
• evaluate public opinion using real historical polling
• connect preBrexit attitudes to later developments
• understand why Europe became a defining political issue

 

EXTRACTS AND LINKS

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NOP Bulletin 1967 April
When NOP last asked questions about the Common Market, in February, 52% were in favour of trying to join (compared with 62% last July) and 26% were opposed (including 20% of Labour supporters). It may be that the actual making of the decision will swing some support behind the Government, but it seems certain that the next series of by-elections will produce a crop of anti-market candidates. It will be interesting to see where their votes come from.

NOP Bulletin 1967 May – Page 1 – NOP Reports – The AMSR Online Archive

EEC/EU Membership

NOP Political Bulletin 1973 October
Approval of Britain’s membership of the EEC has continued to fall; only one third of electors now approve. This is 10% fewer than when we first joined in January.
The drop in support for British membership has been mainly among Conservative supporters. Only half of them now approve compared with 59% in June. The reasons for this growing dislike of British membership become clearer when one examines the things that electors think cause inflation. Half of the electorate blame the Common Market for rising prices and inflation.
A quarter of the electorate chose the British membership of the EEC as the most important cause of rising prices. This may well explain why support for British membership is declining.

NOP Political Bulletin 1973 October – Page 1 – NOP Reports – The AMSR Online Archive

Political, Social, Economic Review 1982 February
The EEC proved to split respondents, exactly as it had done in a previous poll in October. Altogether 45% favoured immediate withdrawal and 44% opposed it, but the difference between these two figures is certainly not statistically significant. Conservatives were strongly against withdrawal. Labour voters strongly in favour and Alliance supporters were equally split.
Respondents then are divided as to whether we should leave the EEC, but they were in no doubt that there should be a referendum before any decision was taken. Two in three wanted a referendum and although current Labour policy is to leave without a referendum. Labour voters were the strongest supporters of the referendum (78%).

Political, Social, Economic Review 1982 February – Page 8 – NOP Reports – The AMSR Online Archive
NOP Political, Social, Economic Review Issue no.42 1983 June – Page 11 – NOP Reports – The AMSR Online Archive

British Public Opinion Issue 06.05 1984 May
May 29: Gallup poll conducted throughout the Common Market finds that one in four EEC citizens wants Britain out of the Common Market. The proportions in each country wanting Britain out are: France 41%, Luxembourg 38%, West Germany 33%, Greece 27%, Netherlands 23%, Belgium 20%, Italy 18%, Denmark 15% and Ireland 14% (Guardian).

British Public Opinion Issue 06.05 1984 May – Page 3 – MORI British Public Opinion – The AMSR Online Archive

British Public Opinion Issue 10.08 1988 October
EUROPE September 25: NOP: Forty-three per cent of adults think Britain would have a greater say in world affairs by maintaining its “special relationship” with the United States, while 47% think closer links with Europe would increase its influence. 59% agree that European countries in NATO should devote more resources to defence rather than relying on the US, while 31% disagree. 31% believe Mrs Thatcher’s speeches against a “United States of Europe” will leave Britain isolated in the EEC, while 52% think she was acting in Britain’s best interests. 47% agree with the principle of a common European currency, while 48% disagree. 25% agree that more decision making power than at present should be given to the European Parliament rather than Westminster while 67% disagree. Fieldwork: 23 September 1988, sample: 1,043. [Mail On Sunday].

British Public Opinion Issue 10.08 1988 October – Page 10 – MORI British Public Opinion – The AMSR Online Archive

British Public Opinion Issue 11.06 1989 July/August
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY June 16: Gallup: Fifty-five per cent regard Britain's membership of the EC as a good thing, 18% a bad thing, and 23% neither good nor bad. 58% think protection of the environment is a matter to be decided within the Community, while 38% think it is a matter for the British Government. 62% think their children will feel more a part of Europe, and 3% less a part, than they do. Fieldwork: 12-21 May 1989, sample-1,274. [The Times]

British Public Opinion Issue 11.06 1989 July/August – Page 8 – MORI British Public Opinion – The AMSR Online Archive

British Public Opinion Issue 13.10 1990 November
Geoffrey Howe’s resignation on 1 November marked two things: it was the latest in a difficult, not to say accident-prone, month for the Conservatives, and particularly for Mrs Thatcher; and it was the third major casualty in the Cabinet over the issue of Europe in twelve months. First there was Nigel Lawson this time last year, then Nicholas Ridley and now Sir Geoffrey Howe, the last surviving member of Thatcher’s original 1979 cabinet. Her strong stance against further European Union at the Rome summit on 28th October has lost her a respected and long-standing colleague.
A survey of backbenchers conducted for On The Record by On-line Telephone Surveys, a subsidiary of MORI, found that even amongst Conservative MPs, support for a single European currency, and the expectation that such a currency will become a reality within a decade, are higher than Thatcher might have expected.

British Public Opinion Issue 13.10 1990 November – Page 5 – MORI British Public Opinion – The AMSR Online Archive

EEC/EU Membership
Read this summary about how we felt historically about Europe:  Have we always been unsure about Europe? – AMSR